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Abstract
Within the Political Budget Cycle theory (PBC), it is well known that reelection-seeking incum-
bents have incentives to manipulate economic outcomes through fiscal policy. However, there is no
research to asses the conditions under which manipulating taxes and spending e↵ectively serve those
interests of political survival. In our first chapter, we argue that the incentives to do so will depend
on the extent to which output can be e↵ectively a↵ected in the short-run. Our theory suggests that
politicians follow such strategy with di↵erent degrees of information, and shows why some incumbent
presidents have been more successful in manipulating the fiscal policy than others using a sample of
13 Latin American countries between 1980 and 2005.
Our second chapter estimates the macroeconomic e↵ects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks with a
three variable Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model. Our sample country is Costa Rica,
for which there is no literature on the topic. Using quarterly data from 1991 until 2009, we found a
negative and small impact of fiscal policy on output, while a small positive of revenue.
Based on these results, we decided to test the existence of an indirect tool the incumbent may still
have through the regulated price industries. Our theory suggests that a regulator-agency will choose
the price which maximizes the political support for the incumbent government-regulator. We provide
evidence with monthly data from 1986 until 2014, from a wider regulated market: Costa Rica. We
also provide insights on the e↵ect of elections on gasoline prices (as a proxy for regulated markets)
for a a panel of ten Latin American countries of annual data from 2001-2012. And we contribute to
the literature by proposing a non parametric approach describing the relationship between prices in
regulated markets and election timing.
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Introduction
Our thesis is empirical in nature and primarily deals with political cycles in relation to fiscal
policy and regulated markets. Political incumbents in democracies have a wide variety of tools
with which to change and sculpt the social and economic environment of a country. The way they
carry this out depends on their ideology, existent political constraints and their own motivations,
among many other factors. One of their motivations seems to be of common sense: they want to
be re-elected or, if re-election is not allowed by law, they want their political party to continue in
power. The Political Budget Cycle theory (PBC) supports this electoral motivation, stating that
incumbents try to manipulate the economic conditions to maximize their popularity, thus increasing
the probability of staying in power.
The main goal of this thesis will be, through three di↵erent fields of analysis, to provide a bet-
ter understanding of political cycles, fiscal policies and regulated markets in developing countries,
specifically in Latin America. We will explore how the political cycle theory has evolved from being
budget related to being in alliance with the regulated markets. Mainly because of all the research
done on PBC, as time has gone by it has turned out to be more di cult to conclude a uniform
way of manipulating spending before the elections; actually most empirical research in its favor,
happens to be very context specific. It is an interesting puzzle, as stated by Iversen and Soskice
(2006:434), as to why there is so little consensus on the evidence for a widespread and significant
political manipulation of the economy.
It has been forty years since Nordhaus proposed the political business cycles theory (PBC),
arguing that electoral timing caused an increase in government spending so the voters would feel
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economically better o↵, signaling that the incumbent was competent and increasing his chances of
being re-elected. In democracies, it is well known that reelection-seeking incumbents have incentives
to manipulate economic outcomes through fiscal policy. The cost of this manipulation will vary
across time and space, as there are di↵erent ways of implementation, and of course a wide diversity
of contexts. Some politicians will govern under situations where manipulation is cheap, given that
the impact of their fiscal policy is more e↵ective, while others must proceed employing much more
e↵ort with the aim of influencing the state of the economy and therefore the economic-vote.
However, there is no research to asses the conditions under which manipulating taxes and spend-
ing e ciently serve those interests of political survival. Therefore, in our first chapter we argue that
the electoral return of spending an additional unit varies dramatically according to other economic
contextual variables, and in the same direction, the sensibility of the PBC towards its real electoral
e ciency depends on them. While some past research emphasizes other conditional arguments such
as the proximity to the next election, or the level of trade openness, we state that under some
economic contexts there is simply no incentive to manipulate the fiscal policy at all, while in other
conditions those incentives are augmented.
Our argument is that there is an objective and measurable impact in terms of e↵ectiveness of
increasing public spending (or decreasing taxes) before an election, which determines the cost an
incumbent has to incur when manipulating to gain votes for the next election. If manipulating the
fiscal policy is absolutely ine↵ective, then its cost is infinite. Incentives to implement an expansion-
ary fiscal policy, as the next election approaches, will depend on the extent to which output can be
e ciently a↵ected in the short-run. Our theory suggests that politicians follow such strategy with
di↵erent degrees of information, and shows why some incumbent presidents have been more suc-
cessful in manipulating the fiscal policy than others using a sample of 13 Latin American countries
between 1980 and 2005.
In our second chapter we intend to indirectly test PBC’s main assumption, being that the fiscal
policy can impact on the economic context, having an e↵ect on voters’ decisions at the polls. Even
if there are context conditions that allow a change in fiscal policy as we demonstrate in the first
8
chapter, its impact may not be perceivable by consumers and therefore not the best strategy for
the incumbent if he is seeking re election. In order to examine the dynamic responses of output
and determine if fiscal expansive measures (increasing spending or reducing taxes) have a positive
e↵ect on economic growth we estimate the macroeconomic e↵ects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks
in Costa Rica (for the first time) using a three variable Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)
model and quarterly data from 1991 until 2009.
Implicitly, in this chapter, we also test the main assumption of the PBC theory. As stated, we
believe that knowing the fiscal policy e↵ectiveness in Costa Rica or any other country through the
e↵ect of its short term multiplier allows us to test if it is possible for the incumbent to manipulate the
economy’s output through fiscal policy. It is true, though, that we do not have information on how
well familiarized are the politicians with this technical knowledge. According to Drazen (2000:2),
if voters respond to good economic conditions, they are more likely to vote for the incumbent if
an expansionary fiscal policy provides higher growth. However, even if good economic conditions
help an incumbent’s chances of reelection, it is not very clear that fiscal manipulation per se will be
e↵ective as politicians may have very limited ability to successfully manipulate the economy because
of a lack of technical ability to time the expansion accurately enough for it to occur just before the
elections.
After exploring the e ciency of fiscal policy through its multiplier and acknowledging that most
of the empirical evidence of the last decade on PBCs has proven to be context-conditioned (consid-
ering the results of our first chapter) we decided to test the existence of an indirect tool the political
incumbent may still have through the regulated price industries.
Is there a relationship between political cycles and prices in regulated industries? The main
purpose of our third chapter is to provide significant empirical evidence of the e↵ect elections may
have on regulated industry prices. For its development, we focused on two di↵erent samples; firstly,
a panel data for ten countries in Latin America with annual data (from 2001-2012) using the price
of gasoline as a proxy for the regulated industry and secondly, one which explores the Costarican
case, with monthly data from 1986 until 2014.
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Our theory is based on Peltzman’s work (1976) and Paiva (1996) which reveal as a formal the-
oretical model that a regulator-agency will choose the price which maximizes the political support
for the incumbent government-regulator. With this chapter we also contribute to the literature by
proposing a non parametric approach which supports our hypothesis on the relationship between
the prices in regulated markets and the election timing.
10
Chapter 1
Political Budget Cycles and Fiscal




It is well known that reelection-seeking incumbents have incentives to manipulate economic outcomes
through fiscal policy. However, there is no research to asses the conditions under which manipulating
taxes and spending e↵ectively serve those interests of political survival. We argue that the incentives
to implement an expansionary fiscal policy, as the next election approaches, will depend on the
extent to which output can be e↵ectively a↵ected in the short-run. We test using a sample of 13
Latin American countries between 1980 and 2005, whether incumbents’ strategies are sensible to
the economic conditions under which fiscal manipulation is more or less e↵ective to shape citizens’
perceptions about the economy.
1.1 Introduction
Incumbents have a wide variety of tools to change and sculpt the social and economic environ-
ment of a country. The way they do it depends on their ideology, existent political constraints and
their own motivations, among many other factors. One of their motivations seems to be of common
sense: they want to be re-elected. The Political Budget Cycle theory (PBC) supports this electoral
motivation, stating that incumbents try to manipulate the economic conditions to maximize their
popularity, thus increasing the probability of staying in power.
The cost of this manipulation will vary across time and space, as there are di↵erent ways of
implementation, and of course a wide diversity of contexts. Some politicians will govern under sit-
uations where manipulation is cheap, given that the impact of their fiscal policy is more e↵ective,
while others must proceed employing much more e↵ort with the aim of influencing the state of the
economy and therefore the economic-vote. Therefore, we argue that the electoral return of spending
an additional unit varies dramatically according to other economic contextual variables, and in the
same direction, the sensibility of the PBC towards its real electoral e↵ectiveness depends on them.
While some past research emphasizes other conditional arguments such as the proximity to the next
election, or the level of trade openness, we state that under some economic contexts there is simply
no incentive to manipulate the fiscal policy at all, while in other conditions those incentives are
exacerbated.
This area of current investigation, in political economy, emerged around the 1970’s with the aim
of explaining the behavior of policymakers before elections as, in democracies, candidates compete,
ceteris paribus, by signaling an improvement in each voter’s present situation; if they are elected
the voter will be better-o↵. Its precursor was Kalecki (1943), who introduced a new theory where
business cycles were caused by political events; he explained that if governments carry out public
investment, or subsidize consumption, and in addition, its expenditure is financed by borrowing
and not by taxation, the e↵ective demand for goods and services may increase until full employ-
ment is reached. Furthermore, Nordhaus (1975) concludes that, in a perfect democracy, there is a
predictable pattern of policy: in early years there will be austerity and, at the end of the in-o ce
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period, there will be a feast: parties will make decisions biased against future generations, in order
to remain in o ce, because voters will benefit from full employment.
Since then, several political economists have included electoral motivations in their theoretical1
studies of policymaking. Nevertheless, empirical research2 on the topic, analyzed through policy
instruments (i.e. fiscal expansion3) has not reached a consensus in support or against the theory
and common perception of the existence of a PBC, di↵er in regularity, magnitudes and significance.
It is an interesting puzzle, as stated by Iversen and Soskice (2006:434), why is there so little
consensus on the evidence for a widespread and significant political manipulation of the economy?
Or as Lewis-Beck (1988) state, if the economy influences the vote (which it does) and politicians
want to be re-elected (which they do) how can there not be an opportunistic PBC? In other words,
research has showed that the state of the economy influences the voting decisions of individuals
and political economy theory has assumed that politicians have an opportunistic or partisan utility
function, meaning they want to be re-elected or their party to remain in power. Based on this, how
come there is so little consensus on the evidence for an opportunistic Political Budget Cycle?
Our argument is that there is an objective and measurable impact in terms of e↵ectiveness of
increasing public spending (or decreasing taxes) before an election, which determines the cost an
incumbent has to incur when manipulating to gain votes for the next election. If manipulating fiscal
policy is absolutely ine↵ective, then its cost is infinite. But when it is e↵ective, increasing govern-
ment spending is expected to have real e↵ects on the economy. Politicians assess the fiscal cost of
the number of votes they need to remain in power. We would expect that when the incumbent faces
electoral disadvantage –i.e. the electoral ine↵ectiveness of manipulating the fiscal policy is high, it
increases the size of the PBC. It is precisely when new votes are expensive that we would predict to
observe the largest PBC.
1Hibbs (1977), Tufte (1978), Frey and Schneider (1978), Beck (1987) and Person and Tabellini (2000), Shi and
Svensson (2006), Duch and Stevensson (2008), for example.
2Garrett (1998), Bernhard and Leblang (1999), Oatley (1999) and Boix (2000), Iversen and Soskice (2006), Streb
et al.(2009), Barberia and Avelino (2011), among many others.
3There would be an expected change on the policy before the elections take place.
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In recent decades Latin America has been marked by political instability and macroeconomic
fluctuations, therefore a significant share of the literature directed at PBCs in developing democra-
cies has focused on it. One of the most often cited arguments on the topic says we should expect
to find greater political budget cycle e↵ects in developing democracies because of the level of de-
velopment of their political institutions. 4 In addition, Schuknecht (2000) has argued that political
institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, central banking authorities, and the media may
not be autonomous or institutionalized in the early stages of democracy.
Given this empirical background, our aim is to measure for the region, the electoral e↵ective-
ness of the fiscal policy with the elasticity of the demand for money with respect to the interest rate
within the IS-LM framework, giving evidence for some understudied aspects within PBC theory. If
the money demand is highly sensitive to the interest rate, a small increase in the interest rate will
be enough to restore the market equilibrium after a fiscal expansion, with no expected e↵ect on the
level of output. We estimate whether the e↵ectiveness of manipulating fiscal policy a↵ects PBC in
a sample of 13 Latin American countries between 1980 and 2005.
One of the main restrictions in empirical studies, is the di culty of measuring the turning point
of the political cycle -when the government begins implementing policies with an opportunistic goal.
Most researchers have employed a dummy variable to capture the e↵ect of this point in time, meaning
they select the time of the change; in general, they test in a yearly basis before elections.Although
this measure is the standard, it is subjective and could be inaccurate, a↵ecting the results. The
moment for fiscal manipulation can vary for a vast amount of reasons, taking di↵erent timing for
each of them. More importantly, if the sign of policies is reversed after elections, lower frequency
data may mask PBCs because the e↵ects in the election year cancel out. 5 Therefore, one of our
contributions by using quarterly data is to overcome this drawback, giving a greater scope when
looking at the electoral timing e↵ects on the behavior of fiscal manipulation.
Next a brief review of the theoretical background and empirical evidence will be given, followed
by the econometric analysis and discussion of results. Finally, section four concludes and discusses
4Persson and Tabellini 2003, Keefer 2005, Keefer and Khemani 2005, Brender and Drazen 2005 and Gonzalez 2002
5see Akhmedov and Zhuravskayas (2004) study on Russia
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areas for further research.
1.2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical basis for the present analysis is given on one hand by the PBC theory, stated by
Nordhaus (1975), and on the other hand, by the Mundell-Fleming approach, which relates govern-
ment spending with its impact on total output. This section aims to link the theoretical framework
to our argument for the subsequent explanation of our hypotheses.
1.2.1 Pre electoral fiscal manipulation
According to Drazen (2000a), there are three (main) ways in which policymakers’ behavior may
be a↵ected by re-election uncertainty. Firstly, they may choose policies to influence the probability
of remaining in power; if they can do this, they will choose policies to try to increase this probability,
which may have significant e↵ects on economic outcomes. Secondly, when there is a chance that
someone with di↵erent preferences may replace the policymaker, he will have an incentive to opt for
policies that will influence his successor’s policy choices by changing the constraints the successor
will confront. And finally, even when the policymaker cannot a↵ect the probability of remaining
in o ce, or the policies of his successor, uncertainty about who will hold o ce can have important
e↵ects on economic results.
Schumpeter (1939) discussed the electoral motivations that may guide government policies in
his study of business cycles, then Kalecki (1943) described them, and Kramer (1971)6 linked for
the first time economic conditions to election outcomes, regressing votes received by the incumbent
party to growth rate of real per capita income and the inflation rate for that year. He found that
the votes going to the incumbent party were inversely related to the inflation rate and positively
related to the growth of income.
A few years later, Nordhaus (1975:187-188) developed a model of economic cycles determined by
political events, which was called the Political Business Cycle model, PBC. He argued that the basic
6He studied the percentage of the vote going to the Republican candidates for the House of Representatives between
1896 and 1964 by the state of the economy.
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di culty in making inter-temporal choices in democratic systems has to do with the high discount
rate for future consumption, as the implicit weighting function on consumption has positive value
during the electoral period, but is zero or very small in the future. One of his main conclusions
had to do with the predictability pattern of policy: an incumbent’s term in o ce starts with rela-
tive scarcity in the first years of governance, but ends with a larger expenditure right before elections.
Since Nordhaus, several studies have tested whether unemployment, inflation or real income
a↵ect the vote for the incumbent, in order to confirm Kramer’s results. Fair (1978) found that the
change in real economic activity (real per capita GNP or the change in unemployment) in election
years has an important e↵ect on votes for the president. Additionally, he found that voters ap-
parently have a high discount rate on past economic performance; they just consider one year or
two before the election. In the same line, Duch and Stevenson (2008) argue that governments that
manage strong economic growth during their o ce period are more likely to be re-elected.
The main assumptions of these early and subsequent models were that elected leaders in con-
trol of monetary policy were able to manipulate (successfully) the economic activity and surprising
myopic voters who formed their opinions based solely on past incumbent performance and inflation
rates (Avelino and Barberia, 2011). Still, research has evolved, going from myopic voters,7 to a con-
text with rational voters, (first and second-generation models) where voters take the pre-electoral
economic situation as an indicator of government performance. Thus, an election year expansion
demonstrates the incumbent’s governing ability.8
As well, studies have argued that monetary surprises are an unconvincing driving force for po-
litical business cycles, so they have included and tested models that emphasize fiscal policy as the
motivating force for opportunistic cycles (Drazen 2000a). Their basic rationale is that governments
manipulate their fiscal policy to increase the probability of an electoral success. Based on empirical
research, a significant number of recent studies have argued that PBCs are more acute and more
marked in the case of less developed countries (Block 2002a, 2002b; Block et al. 2003; Shi and
7Basic assumption in the first generation of PBC models; voters never learn from their mistakes; each government
lets them believe that they deviate from the long run Phillips curve, and they fall for the trick.
8For the formal explanation of both generations of PBC model please refer to Appendix 1.
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Svensson 2002, 2006; Schuknecht 2000).
Along the empirical results, theories have made important advances in two important realms
(Drazen 2000a). Firstly, models including those developed by Rogo↵ and Siebert (1988) and Ro-
go↵ (1990) have incorporated forward-looking, rational expectations. And secondly, they have re-
searched the e↵ects of right and left-wing party orientation on macroeconomic outcomes during and
after elections (Alesina 1987). Accordingly, the objectives for the policy-maker to remain in o ce
are characterized as partisanship9 when the incentive is to implement a specific program, and/or
opportunistic10 , when the aim is to remain in power. The partisan model predicts that left-wing
governments will generate an economic expansion while the right-wing governments a contraction
early to mid-way through their terms. The opportunistic, predicts that Presidents whose parties
consequently hold on to the Presidency at the next election will have expanding economies as the
election approaches.
Although a distinction is drawn between these reasons, Drazen (2000a) argued that, in order
to implement their preferred policies, partisan policymakers, may display opportunistic behavior, as
they need to be in o ce in order to implement those policies. Therefore, realistically, we consider
these as complementary and recognize combinations between opportunistic and partisan incentives.
The incentive for fiscal manipulation before elections exists, but the capability to remain in
o ce clearly will depend on the ability to implement the policies which maximize the utility for
those who elect them: a small group, a single individual or all the population, limited by factors
such as institutional constraints, the cost of losing o ce and the exchange-rate regime.
Whether governments are able to manipulate their fiscal policy in order to get a positive growth
result in the election period is the main debate in the literature on PBC. The empirical evidence is
diverse, even when the studies are for the same country. For example, when analyzing the United
States’ PBC, Alesina has tested, through di↵erent articles, the temporary partisan electoral e↵ects
on real outcomes. He argues, according to Grier (2008:337-338) that because un-modeled tempo-
9Hibbs (1978) and Alesina (1987)
10Nordhaus (1975) and Rogo↵ and Sibert (1988)
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rary partisan e↵ects can look like opportunistic cycles, any empirical evidence of the latter can be
discounted. Faust and Irons (1999), on the other hand, conclude that there is no evidence for an
electoral influence in the US economy. They state that Alesina’s evidence is the product of an
under-specified regression model and endogenous regressors. But Grier (2008) finds a significant
influence of elections on quarterly real GDP growth when controlling for multiple lags of interest
rate changes, inflation, money growth, among many other variables.
Based on empirical research, a significant number of studies have argued that PBCs are more
acute and more marked in the case of less developed countries (Block 2002a, 2002b; Block et al.
2003; Shi and Svensson 2002, 2006; Schuknecht 2000). Specifically for Latin America, Ames (1977)
found that government expenditures rose prior to and after the 65 elections that took place in seven-
teen Latin American countries between 1948 and 1970 11 Considering the same group of countries,
Ames (1987) reports that government expenditures increased by 6.3% in the pre-election year and
decreased by 7.6% in the year after the 82 elections that took place between 1947 and 1982.
There are other studies considering the political determinants of government spending and bud-
get deficits for sub-sets of Latin American democracies, which have produced evidence in favor of
PBCs (Amorim Neto and Borsani 2004; Mejia Acosta and Coppedge 2001). The latter, controlled
for di↵erent political determinants in a study of eight Latin American countries between 1983 and
1998, finding that budget deficits worsen during elections, though government expenditures are not
found to increase. Amorim Neto and Borsani (2004) confirmed those findings by analyzing the in-
fluence of presidential and cabinet e↵ects in ten Latin American countries between 1980 and 1998.
The authors argue that fiscal di culties during the electoral time are driven by the reluctance of
governments to increase taxes. Barberia and Avelino (2011) used data from the entire sample of
eighteen Latin American democracies for the period between 1973 and 2008, confirming that elec-
tions provoke increases in the fiscal deficit, but that the pattern is not contingent on a country being
in the early phase of its democratic transition.
More recently, Kaplan and Thomsson (2016) challenge the idea that politicians use budget
11only post-election spending proved to be statistically significant.
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deficits as a PBC tool by incorporating the financial constraints they face into an electoral framework.
They argue that when highly indebted governments rely more on international bond markets, as
opposed to bank lending, politicians alter the way they respond to voters. Their theoretical argument
suggests that greater ownership dispersion among global creditors (bond financing regime) should
decrease budgets deficits generally, and reduce macroeconomic cyclicality around elections.They
test their hypothesis for a panel of 16 Latin American countries from 1961 to 2011, and show that
politicians exhibit more fiscal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through
decentralized bond markets during election periods.
1.2.2 Theoretical Background Model
For the theoretical analysis of the relationship between fiscal policy e↵ectiveness and the be-
havior of the PBC, and in accordance with Clark and Hallerberg (2000:325), we are going to assume
that fiscal policy, controlled by elected o cials, manipulates taxation and expenditure to obtain a
desired macroeconomic outcome. Similarly, we hold the standard PBC assumption that elected of-
ficials receive benefits when there is an electorally timed increase in growth and employment, which
compensates the negative impact of such strategy on inflation rates.
The incumbent/government (i) and central bank (cb) each have preferences over macroeconomic
outcomes; these are represented by a quadratic loss function, describing the deviations from their
ideal values for unemployment and inflation:12
Lj = (y   y⇤j )2 +  j(⇡   ⇡⇤j )2, where j = i, cb (1.2.1)
where ⇡ and y are inflation and output, ⇡⇤ and y⇤ are the actor’s ideal plans, and   is the weight
the actor attaches to inflation stabilization relative to the output goals.
We assume preferences between and among actors will be reflected in their ideal rate of growth
and that they share an ideal of zero rate inflation; hence, ⇡⇤i = ⇡⇤cb = 0. On top, both actors would
like to stabilize the economy at its natural rate of growth.13
12Clark and Hallerberg (2000).
13The level of growth consistent with price stability.
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As stated before, we assume the government has an opportunistic utility function, therefore,
incumbents will try to push output above its natural rate before elections to gain support. Hence,
during the electoral period, preferences change
y⇤i = kiy
n (1.2.2)
where yn is the natural rate of growth, and k > 1 for electoral periods, and k = 1 in non electoral
times.
We assume the central bank is independent, hence, it will not have pressure from the incumbent.
As a result, the bank’s preferred growth rate will be the same in electoral and non electoral periods,
y⇤cb = kcby
n, k = 1 (1.2.3)
Both actors can a↵ect the economy through the manipulation of a short-term, expectations-
enhanced Phillips curve:
y = yn + µ(⇡   ⇡e) +  g (1.2.4)
where ⇡e is the existent rate of expected inflation in time t, from sticky wage contracts signed at
time t  1; g is the government expenditure,   is the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy transmission, and
µ is the e↵ectiveness coe cient for monetary policy transmission.
The government will choose the level of budget (g) to minimize its loss function. Substituting
the government’s preferred level of output (y⇤i ) in the Phillips curve process,
Li = (y
n + µ(⇡   ⇡e) +  g   kiyn)2 +  i(⇡   ⇡⇤i )2 (1.2.5)
The central bank observes the level of spending chosen by the government and responds by
setting inflation (such that it increases with ⇡e), and the tendency to push output above its natural
rate. Minimizing its loss function, we obtain its preferred level of inflation (⇡).
9
Lcb = (y
n + µ(⇡   ⇡e) +  g   kcbyn)2 +  cb(⇡   ⇡⇤cb)2 (1.2.6)
@Lcb
@⇡
= 0 =) ⇡ = 1
µ+  µ
[µ⇡e   yn(1  kcb) +  g] (1.2.7)
The government anticipates and incorporates it into the budget, setting net government spending
propensity to push the economy above the natural rate of growth and inflationary expectations,
@Li
@g
= 0 =) gelect = 1
 
[yn(ki   1)  µ(⇡   ⇡e)] (1.2.8)





From these equations, we can study the e↵ect of the electoral period on fiscal policy decisions,
from the di↵erence between equilibrium policies in the electoral and non electoral periods,
gPBC = gelect   gne = 1
 
[yn(ki   1)] (1.2.10)
We argue that the contextual variable, fiscal policy transmission e↵ectiveness, represented by
  will change through time and by knowing this elasticity, politicians can predict how e↵ective and





[yn(ki   1)] (1.2.11)
According to the result of (1.2.11), there is always a negative relationship between the e↵ec-
tiveness measure of fiscal policy and the level of expenditure chosen by the government during the
electoral period, because (ki   1) will always be positive in electoral times. From this result we
build our hypotheses in order to define the impact of elections on fiscal policy when its e↵ectiveness
changes,
• Hypothesis 1 - When the money demand elasticity is low, the amplitude of the PBC will be
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larger, as the e↵ort from the incumbent would have an e↵ect on output; its fiscal policy would
be more e↵ective.
• Hypothesis 2 - When the money demand elasticity is high, then it is hard to distinguish a
PBC, as the level of manipulation needed would be too expensive in order to have an e↵ect on
the economy.
• Hypothesis 3 - The e↵ect of fiscal policy manipulation can be measured before elections (as
expansionary) or after (when it contracts), both e↵ects should cancel out.
Even though the previous model provides information on the fiscal multiplier and its behavior
in electoral and non electoral periods, we consider further explanation on the multiplier, this time
within the Mundell-Fleming framework.
Fiscal policy e↵ectiveness
We will consider the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy through the elasticity of money demand, Md,
with respect to the interest rate, based on the standard Mundell-Fleming model. As we know, the
Goods Market within this model is represented by the IS curve:
AD = [C + cTR+ c(1  t)Y ] + (I   bi) +G+NX (1.2.12)
where, C is consumption, TR are transfers, Y is income, I is autonomous investment, i is the interest
rate, G is the government expenditures and NX is net exports. Knowing that Y = AD, and with
some rearrangement, we obtain
Y = A+ c(1  t)Y   bi, where A = C + cTR+ I +G+NX (1.2.13)
This expression of Y , can be simplified as Y = ↵g(A  bi), where the multiplier ↵g = 11 c(1 t) . This
multiplier along with the sensitivity of investment with respect to the interest rate determine the
steepness of the IS curve. As we can see, fiscal policy can a↵ect the multiplier through taxes, and
can a↵ect A through government expenditure or transfers.
The Money Market is represented by the LM curve:
11
MP
= kY   hi (1.2.14)
where h reflects the sensitivity of the real money balances to the interest rate and k depicts the
sensitivity of real money balances to the level of income. From this equation, we observe that the
greater the responsiveness of the demand for money to income (k) and the lower the responsiveness
to the interest rate (h), the steeper the LM curve will be.

















Showing that the equilibrium level of income depends on two exogenous variables: the autonomous
spending (A), which includes C, I,G, TR and NX, and the real money stock, MP . In the same way,


















From the interaction between the goods and money market we obtain the fiscal multiplier, which
entails how e↵ective fiscal policy might be on manipulating the level of output;14 the impact of a
change in government expenditure, G, on total output, Y , within this framework will be given by
@y
@g




14The next chapter incorporates the latest study on fiscal multipliers as it is the theory behind the estimation of
the dynamic e↵ects of Costa Rica’s fiscal policy.
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where   is the fiscal government spending multiplier, h reflects the sensitivity of the real money
balances to the interest rate, k depicts the sensitivity of real money balances to the level of income,
b is the responsiveness of investment to the interest rate and ↵g is the multiplier which suggests that
output changes when autonomous spending (including investment) changes; that change in output
can be larger than the change in autonomous spending.
Studying  , we can see that it is less than ↵g, since
h
h+kb↵g
is < 1.15 From the expression in the
above equation, we see that it approaches zero, when h is very small, and it approaches ↵g when h
goes to 1. Likewise, a large value of b or k would diminish the impact of fiscal policy over the level
of output.16
The comparative statics from Clark and Hallerberg’s (2000:327) work were developed assuming
strict scenarios under the Mundell-Fleming framework, i.e. capital is either mobile or immobile,
exchange rates are either fixed or flexible. Therefore the only combination of circumstances where
both fiscal and monetary policy could have some e↵ect on output, 0 <   < 1, and 0 < µ < 1,
would be in a closed economy. For the case with fixed exchange rates and fully mobile capital, for
example, they standardize the parameters of monetary and fiscal policy e↵ectiveness so that,   = 1,
and µ = 0. In contrast, this study does not assume strict scenarios where capital is fully mobile or
immobile to define the behavior of the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy.
1.3 Latin American Context, from 1980 until 2005
Before empirically evaluating our hypotheses, it is important to set the historical-economic con-
text of the studied region. The countries of Latin America are widely heterogenous, even though,
their proximity and shared economic characteristics have allowed for some of its countries to expe-
rience similar episodes such as debt crisis, transitional democratic periods, currency movements, to
mention some. We will focus on 25 years of its economic and political history, from 1980 until 2005;
specifically on the episodes which contextualize our study and may provide important insights about
15 h
h+kb↵g
=) h < h+ kb↵g , from which we conclude that, kb↵g > 0
16A high level of k means an increment on money demand as income increases, and therefore an increment on the
interest rate; combining it to a high level of b, it implies a significant reduction in private aggregate demand.
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the results obtained.
Politically and in terms of competitive elections, many countries of the region experienced the
transition to democracy between 1974 and 1990: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay. While countries such as Panama and
Paraguay returned to democracy in the mid 1990s. In many cases, Mexico is considered to have
initiated a process of political liberalization and democratic transition mirrored in the defeat of the
hegemonic party, PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional), in the presidential elections of the year
2000, when Vicente Fox from PAN (Partido Accion Nacional) party won.
In general terms, reelection continues to be prohibited in most Latin American countries; some
exceptions within our sample are Carlos Saul Menem in Argentina in 1995, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso in 1994 for Brazil, and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in the 2000. And unlike parliamentary
democracies, elections are typically held on a fixed schedule in presidential democracies such as those
found in Latin America. Of course, there are some exceptions. Fueled by a case of hyperinflation,
Siles Suazo anticipated presidential elections one year earlier than the end of his term in 1985 in
Bolivia. Similarly, in Argentina, Rafael Alfonsin ceded power earlier than anticipated though only a
few months earlier than planned. After only two years in o ce, President de la Rua resigned from
the Argentine presidency in 2001 in light of massive protests and a spiraling economic crisis.
Economically, the seventies were lived under the model of Import Substitution Industrializa-
tion, ISI, which advocates replacing foreign imports with domestic production, aiming to reduce
foreign dependency. Governments followed this model implementing subsidies, taxing agriculture
and transferring resources towards di↵erent industries. They allowed negative real lending interest
rates, and high tari↵s to imported goods. Also, monetary issuance was a policy frequently used.
By the end of this decade there were severe changes on the Latin-American economical context:
the external vulnerability and the wrongful monetary and fiscal policies determined the end of ISI,
dominated by high inflation and fiscal deficits.
By 1982, almost all Latin American countries were immerse in a deep economical crisis; high ex-
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ternal debt levels, excessive expenditure and stabilizing policies based on exchange rate movements
were the common ground. In August, Mexico announced a unilateral moratorium on servicing their
debt. In the world markets, there was a significant increase in interest rates and a worsening of terms
of trade. Between 1982 and 1984 the region’s GDP became stagnant, fixed investment decreased
around 5% of Latin-American annual production and the regional current account deficit became
2.1%.
Among other things, the strong devaluation17 su↵ered by the nations’ currencies boosted high
inflation levels, aggravated by the dependency they had with the external capital goods and produc-
tive inputs. Because of currency movements and higher interest rates, the external debt payments
had a larger share of the financial responsibilities which grew rapidly. Also, some monetary policies
implemented worsened the inflation levels. As a consequence, real wages fell a↵ecting employment
levels.
This situation demanded extreme measures, the programs of structural adjustment were im-
plemented with the intention of generating positive trade balances. Public expenditure diminished
greatly in real terms and there was a general public concern of tax obligations. Some countries de-
cided to reduce their public expenditure, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela,
while others as Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay, increased their income. But in general terms,
the adjustment processes tried di↵erent ways of increasing government revenue; there were cases of
privatization and savings increments in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica and Chile, indirect taxes in
Ecuador, social security contributions in Argentina and Uruguay and tax increases in Colombia and
Uruguay, to name some. A reduction in the government’s action margin was one of the consequences
of the adjustment programs as a large percentage of their revenue was used to pay external debt
services.
During the nineties this tendency changed as the Latin-American economy returned to grow,
but still its growth was moderate and unstable; in 1995 and 1999 change in GDP per capita de-
creased or turned negative, for example. Both of these cases resulted from external shocks: in 1995
17See appendix 01 for graphic information.
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Mexico su↵ered from the investors’ loss of confidence, a↵ecting the whole region, while in 1998 and
1999 it was the e↵ects of the Asian crisis which had an adverse influence because of the volatility
of capital inflows to emerging markets given the movements in their exchange rates. In general,
there was a contagion e↵ect over developing countries but specially on those with low international
monetary reserves, weak financial systems and an overvalued currency.
Figure 1.1: Latin America - Gross Domestic Product
This external sensibility was a consequence of the new role exports had as boosters of the econ-
omy. Which also implied significant reforms to economic institutions in order to have consistency
with trade openness (lowering tari↵s, eliminating protective trade barriers and modifying exchange
rate regimes) and to recover foreign investors’ trust. By the end of the eighties, beginning of the
nineties Latin America addressed the Washington Consensus 18 which gave policy advice towards fis-
cal discipline, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields o↵ering both high economic
returns and the potential to improve income distribution (primary health care, primary education,
and infrastructure), tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base), interest rate
liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign
direct investment, privatization, deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit), and secure
18John Williamson originally coined the phrase in 1990 to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice
being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989.
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property rights. 19
Figure 1.2: Latin America - Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment as percentage of GDP
This new policy framework contributed to stop hyperinflation and to soothe past un-adjustments.
The region started regaining trust and capital inflows came back. The crisis from the eighties had
been so serious that the rebound was significant in relative terms. In this context, the political situa-
tion stabilized with some exceptions (Alberto Fujimori in Peru), democratically elected governments
were institutionalized.
With all its limitations, this new expansion phase has allowed Latin America to overcome one
of its biggest hindrance, inflation. The observed consumer price index had extreme values over 900%
in some cases but since 1990 a lower trend has been observed. There were critical moments for Peru,
Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, between 1984 and 1994, were this index overpassed 500%, still, after
1995, the levels, on average, have been below 15%. We know that a controlled inflation level is vital
for firm confidence and maintaining the purchasing power of wages.
Inflation control and fiscal responsibility came together along with reforms to the public sector.
19as in the Global Trade Negotiations Home page from Harvard University,
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html
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Figure 1.3: Latin America - Consumer Price Index
In general terms, states became smaller, privatizations of state owned companies took place aiming
for market competition, and financial sectors were reformed -starting with Central Banks which
became more independent from the Executive. Fiscal deficits were controlled by increasing public
revenue, which was helped by the economy’s growth. Starting the new decade, there was a boom in
the region given the rebound e↵ect of the late nineties’ and the better social and political climate.
Also, the economies were less vulnerable given their partial modernization.
Although these e↵ects were important, the external situation had a significant role as well.
World economy was growing rapidly given the boom in China and India and the solid pace of devel-
oped economies; world GDP was 4.9% in 2014 and 4.5% in 2015. Also, the Federal Reserve of the
United States fostered an unusual liquidity level which turned to be the monetary policy of developed
countries giving access to cheap financing for public and private sectors. Therefore Latin-America’s
GDP grew 5.7% in 2004 and 4.7% in 2005 on average (refer to graph 01).
Given larger revenues and lower interest rates and the unpleasant experience of the debt crisis,
Latin-American governments decided to invest in lowering debt levels and accumulating interna-
tional reserves. Our next graph shows how the fiscal balance (revenue minus expenditure) ended as
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Figure 1.4: Latin America - Average Revenue and Expenditure as percentage of GDP
a surplus in the year 2005.
This political and economical context enclose the most significant episodes for our empirical
research; even though, there where sets of years were the incumbent’s ability to manipulate the
economy seemed reduced, our interest is to test if the behavior was somewhat di↵erent when elections
approached. Our next section explains the empirical model and data characteristics, to proceed with
the results’ analysis.
1.4 An Empirical Approach
Given the theoretical background in the previous section and earlier empirical studies on elec-
toral cycle,20 we will employ a multivariate regression model to characterize the relationship between
a specific fiscal variable y in country i and year t, yi,t, and the electoral cycle; it can be depicted in







 jxj,i,t +  EEi,t +  zi,t + ⌘zi,tEi,t +
nX
j=1
 jtj,t + µi + "i,t (1.4.1)
20As Streb et al (2009:434)
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where xj,i,t is a vector of m controls, Ei,t is a dummy election variable, zi,t is a proxy variable for
the elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate, tj,t is a time control variable, µi is
a specific country e↵ect, and the term "i,t is a random error that is assumed independent and iden-
tically distributed. From our hypotheses we would expect a positive relation between the election
dummy variable and a fiscal policy expansion, and the proxy for money demand elasticity, zi,t, to
be significant. This specification represents a dynamic panel model, where the dependent variable
is a function of its own lagged levels, a set of controls and the electoral timing conditioned e↵ect of
the money demand elasticity.
Thirteen Latin American countries21 make up the panel data for this research; it is strongly
balanced. The time period considered is from the first quarter of 1980 until the last quarter of 2005,
which gives a total of 1352 observations.
According to the theoretical model developed in the latter section, we are interested in the
incumbent’s ability to boost a fiscal expansion during the electoral period, therefore, the dependent
variable of our model will be the central government’s balance (revenue22 - expenditure) as percent-
age of the GDP. Therefore, the expected sign of the electoral dummy is negative. The budget balance
must be smaller when elections take place as expenditure would increase or taxes would decrease.
We include the fourth lag of the dependent variable, supporting the decision on the Akaike informa-
tion criteria test, with the purpose of controlling for temporal stickiness in the government’s fiscal
position.
Given the heterogeneity in income and growth rates across the region, it is important to include
economic controls, the level of economic development, defined as the log of the gross domestic prod-
uct per capita will be included as it considers the di↵erent rates at which each country reached its
development level since the 80’s. Also,23 we select the growth rate of real GDP as control variable
because it captures the e↵ects of the business cycle on the budget surplus (the pro-cyclical behavior
21Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay
and Venezuela. Because of data availability, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala could not
be included in the sample.
22Considering grants
23following Shi and Svensson (2006) and the theoretical model.
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of tax collection, among others, can cause an increment in booms and a fall in recessions). It is fair
to mention, that both variables related to GDP behave di↵erently within the model; not necessarily
a bigger GDP would imply a larger GDP per capita. As to time e↵ects, we introduce time variables
such as quinquennial dummies for the whole sample, and quarterly dummies to control for season-
ality in each country.
Our variable of interest, the elasticity of Md with respect to the interest rate, i, was estimated
as the change of money supply, M1 (currency in circulation, travelers’ checks, demand deposits and
other checkable deposits), with respect to the change of the real interest rate; in order to include
the e↵ect of expected inflation.24
Our sample considers 66 elections, detailed in the table above, which are coded as a dichoto-
mous variable: one in the quarter in which a regular election occurs and zero otherwise. Following
Streb (2011), we will also look at the pre and post electoral e↵ects of fiscal manipulation. Nordhaus’
(1975) framework stated that the monetary stimulus before elections is compensated afterwards
to avoid long run consequences for inflation. In accordance, a contractive fiscal policy should be
observed after elections; Ames (1987) found empirical evidence to support the hypothesis for Latin
America. On the same line, Persson and Tabellini (2003) came across a similar result for a panel
of 60 democracies. Therefore we include two other variables, the first, ele, is equal to one for the
four quarters before elections, and the second, elep, is equal to one in the four quarters after elections.
24From our theoretical model, and according to the second generation models of PBC, we assume that ⇧et =
E(⇧t|It 1).
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Figure 1.5: Latin America - Election Dates
22
Table 02
General Characterization of Variables
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max
Gvt Balance 1119 -2.0113 5.0514 -74.8403 13.0623
GDPreal 1323 0.0069 0.0223 -0.0896 0.861
GDPpercapita 1336 10.076 3.0649 5.6814 14.502
Mdelast 1098 -1.4961 44.366 -1064.3 536.2
Ele 273 0.194 0.396 0 1
Elep 268 0.191 0.393 0 1
PBC 472 0.053 0.578 -1 1
Table 02 provides a full characterization of each variable. The basic structure of the pooled
regression model would be:
GvtBalance =  0 +  1(GDPreal)t +  2(logGDPpercapita)t +  3(ele)t+
 4(elep)t +  5(Mdelast)t +  6(LDV )t 4 +  7(elexMdelast) + µi
(1.4.2)
For our model, we assume the government has an opportunistic utility function and that elected
o cials control fiscal policy (taxes and expenditure) but they rely on having a majority in all houses
supporting them in order to succeed. A lagged dependent variable is included based on the assump-
tion that past levels of fiscal policy influence the levels in future years. Because of our argument,
interactions between elections and the Md elasticity are necessary. The modeling of the interaction
between these variables is matter of interest as each factor influence the decision making process by
themselves but also, its interaction may have an e↵ect on the political budget cycle.
Given our theoretical background model we know that when Mdelasticity is large, a small
change in the interest rate would recover the equilibrium after a fiscal expansion shock, leaving the
output without e↵ect. Therefore, from our hypotheses, we would expect that when theMdelasticity
is low, the fiscal balance should decrease in pre electoral quarters: we expect a positive sign between
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the interaction of the pre electoral dummy and the elasticity measure. In summary, we expect a
negative sign from our pre electoral dummy variable, a positive sign from the interaction e↵ect pre
elections and Mdelasticity, and the inverse for post electoral timing.
Jorge Streb and Pablo Garofalo kindly provided the quarterly real interest rate and GDP
figures in nominal and real terms. To calculate the latter, they followed the Fernandez (1981)
distribution procedure, available in MATLAB, using quarterly import series. Appendix 03 shows
their computation.25 The fiscal and GDP data are from IFS, International Financial Statistics from
IMF, and the population numbers were taken from the WDI, World Development Indicators, from
WB.
1.4.1 Econometric Analysis
Normally, the analysis of panel data has to consider the classical problems of serial correlation
and unit heterogeneity. Before dealing with them and with the intention of avoiding other series
problems, non-stationarity tests were done. As we know, in a non-stationary time series, its expected
value at time t to be determined by the expected value taken at t0, causing estimation problems26
On this matter, the Fisher test was done; it is based on the p-value of n independent tests and
considers that all series are non-stationary, against the alternative that at least one of them in the
panel is stationary. There is no evidence in this model of a unit root either in the original nor the
transformed series as the null hypothesis of non-stationarity was rejected.
Although the countries considered are supposed to be similar a grosso modo, it is impossible to
think of them as homogenous. Hence, the heterogeneity condition is one of the problems we may
have. Unit heterogeneity can have three di↵erent causes: individual e↵ects, interaction variables,
and omitted variables. Its definition is important because if the individual e↵ects are significant, for
example, OLS estimation would be biased and inconsistent. In order to determine the presence of
heterogeneity, an analysis of the cross sectional variation and the variance over time of the sample
countries is made. Table 03 helps with a part of this evaluation since it shows the decomposition of
25This represents a caveat of the present investigation, as the results will depend on this calculation.
26Cointegration would be needed.
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the standard deviation in two components: between and within variation.
Table 03
Cross Sectional Time Series Summary of Statistics
Variable Specification Mean Std dev Min Max Observations
GvtBalance overall  2.0113 5.0514  74.840 13.0623 N = 1119
between  2.2006  7.0372 1.9506 n = 13
within 4.6793  69.8144 12.1199 T = 86.0769
GDPreal overall 0.0069 0.0223  0.0896 0.0861 N = 1323
between 0.0023 0.0042 0.0122 n = 13
within 0.0222  0.0949 0.0885 T = 101.769
LogGDPpc overall 10.0762 3.0649 5.6814 14.5015 N = 1336
between 3.2042 5.8000 14.4118 n = 13
within 0.1276 9.5995 10.5535 T = 102.769
Mdelasticity overall  1.4961 44.3658  1064.3 536.20 N = 1098
between 3.2647  9.0466 4.1524 n = 13
within 44.2548  1060.3 530.55 T = 84.4615
As intuitively expected, the log of real GDP per capita, has a larger between-countries varia-
tion than within, all the other independent variables reflect their di↵erences among countries as the
within variation is bigger. Almost all variation comes from the heterogeneity within the countries
and not between them, but it has to be tested before making any conclusions. Hence, specification
tests were done in order to contrast the Gauss-Markov theorem27 and determine if the estimators
are the best linear unbiased estimators, BLUE.
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity showed a probability outcome of 0.0000, there-
fore, the null hypothesis of constant variance was rejected. To test the omitted variable bias, a
possible reason for heteroskedasticity, the Ramsey regression specification-error test was applied.
The null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables was rejected.28 The source of this bias
27In this case we will have a BLUE estimator if the errors are homoskedastic and are not serially correlated.
28P-value = 0.0000, rejecting the null hypothesis of no omitted variable bias.
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could be the exclusion of individual e↵ects or the presence of interaction variables.
High multicolinearity between two explanatory variables makes it harder to identify the unique
e↵ect of each variable on the dependent variable; to check for the presence of this problem, the
variance inflation factors test(VIF) was done. It calculates the centered or uncentered VIFs for the
independent variables specified in a linear regression model. Each independent variable has a VIF
value. If the mean VIF value is larger or equal to four, then there is a multicolineality problem. In
the present case the mean VIF was 1.01; the minimum value was for the elasticity measure, 1, the
same values as the GDP per capita. Consequently, there is no problem with multicolinearity.
From these tests, we can confirm that the pooled time-series violate three of the standard as-
sumptions about the error process. First, errors are contemporaneously correlated, such that errors
in country A at time t are correlated with errors in country B at time t. Second, the error process29
displays panel heteroskedasticity, meaning that the variances of the error di↵er among countries.
And third, there might be serial correlation within the same country such that errors at time t are
correlated with errors at time t+ 1.
Assuming that we have a one-way error component model for the disturbances of this panel, the
errors ui,t would be compounded by an unobservable individual specific e↵ect, mi, and a remainder
disturbance, vi. The Fixed E↵ects, FE, model assumes mi, as fixed parameters to be estimated
and the remaining disturbances stochastic with vi independent and identically distributed. The
independent variables are assumed independent of vi for all i and the null hypotheses, H0, states
that all the individual e↵ects, mi, are the same and equal to zero.
As well, tests for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation were done for the FE model. Using the
procedure derived by Wooldridge (2002:282-283) to test for autocorrelation in panel-data models,
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation was rejected, with a probability value of 0.0012. At the
time of testing heteroskedasticity, a modified Wald statistic was used, which tests the hypothesis:
 2i =  
2, homoskedasticity; it was rejected (p = 0.0000). Hence, there is a problem of autocorrelation
29Beck and Katz (1995).
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and heteroskedasticity with this model, as well as omitted variable bias.
Table 3
Summary of Results - Fixed and Random e↵ects
Dependent Variable: Government Balance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
LDV 0.645*** 0.646*** 0.705*** 0.706***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.0296) (0.0296)
GDPreal 10.70* 11.29* 8.002 8.636
(6.4562) (6.4796) (6.4214) (6.4468)
GDPpc -4.124** -4.049** -0.0517 -0.0503
(1.8558) (1.8563) (0.0452) (0.0452)
Mdelast 0.00159 -0.000657 0.00178 -0.000762
(0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0031)
Ele -0.209 -0.205 -0.296 -0.292
(0.2952) (0.2954) (0.2963) (0.2964)
Elep 0.186 0.195 0.236 0.244





cons 38.01** -1.048* 37.25** -0.098*
(17.91) (0.5646) (17.917) (0.5653)
N 875 875 875 875
Rsq 0.416 0.4175
Adj Rsq 0.3995 0.3997
AIC 4800.699 4802.442
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
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The alternative to the FE model is the Random E↵ects model, RE, which assumes mi random,
and independent from vi. In addition, the explanatory variables are independent of mi and vi for
all i. For this model there is no test for autocorrelation; by its assumptions it is ruled out. Even
though this model is an appropriate specification if there would be a random sample from a large
population, its estimation results were analyzed and compared.
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test was done to determine that the null hypothe-
sis of homoskedasticity is rejected at the 10% level, p = 0.0602. Before treating the heteroskedasticity
problem, the interaction e↵ects (between the election variables and the elasticity measure) are in-
cluded in the models, in order to test the hypotheses and to control for the omitted variable bias.
Table 04 display the results for FE and RE, with and without the interaction e↵ects. Model 1 and 3
are the base line models as they consider the main-e↵ects only. In all the models presented, although
the sign on the electoral dummies is the one expected, none of our main variables of interest turned
out significant.
The Hausman test was done to be confident that FE model would give better results for our
model. Through the development of its specification test, Hausman showed that his null hypothesis
could be used to compare bwithin and bbetween. The null hypothesis establishes that the di↵erence
among coe cients is not systematic for this model, therefore, it is rejected in all cases,30 leading to
conclude that the fixed e↵ects model is consistent while the random e↵ects model is not.
Including a lagged dependent variable, LDV, into a fixed e↵ects model causes Nickell-bias,
meaning that the error term would be correlated with the LDV, but because our panel has T > N ,
the estimator is still consistent.
The tests done after obtaining the results from the FE model show that the heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation problem persists. Each of these violations is likely to diminish the estimated
value of standard errors, altering the estimation of significance of the coe cients. Hence the selected
procedure has to solve both problems without generating too many undesired e↵ects. The fitted
30The probability value = 0.0006 and 0.0369.
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panel data model, Beck and Katz (1995) panel corrected standard errors, is used for this purpose.
The linear regression with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) gains explanatory lever-
age from cross-national and cross-temporal data, while correcting for possible spatial and temporal
correlation of errors. We estimated several models, specifying di↵erent scenarios of error correction.
Along with it we included three di↵erent measures of the electoral timing, ele, elep and PBC, were
included. The latter, following Streb (2011) as it responds to our third hypothesis: the e↵ects of
fiscal manipulation before elections, cancel out with the decrease in government balance after elec-
tions. PBC is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the electoral year,  1 for the post election year and
0 otherwise.
As seen in the previous section of the context of Latin America, the region is well known as
one of the more heterogenous and even when some economic context is shared their history can
be completely di↵erent in terms of political reactions, for example. Therefore, country dummies
were included to control for country specific e↵ects. The next tables, 05 and 06, show the results
accounting for individual e↵ects and specify the way in which the errors were corrected.
We can observe that with the PCSE methodology, some estimated coe cients are di↵erent from
before. Looking at our variables of interest, even when having our expected sign, electoral dummies
are not significant, but the interaction between the pre electoral quarters and the Md elasticity is
positive and significant. This result confirms our hypothesis: when money demand elasticity in-




Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Government Balance
Electoral variable: Ele (before elections) and Elep (after elections)
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
LDV 0.646*** 0.638*** 0.624***
(0.0503) (0.0527) (0.0551)
GDPreal 11.29* 9.96 10.20*
(6.012) (6.086) (5.852)
GDPpc -4.049** -4.024* -4.757**
(1.9110) (2.1711) (2.1901)
Mdelast -0.000662 -0.000749 -0.00161
(0.00295) (0.00282) (0.00207)
Ele -0.205 -0.114 -0.11
(0.2976) (0.3279) (0.3342)
Elep 0.195 0.15 0.0634
(0.2887) (0.3174) (0.3222)
Elepelast 0.00774 0.0143 0.0116
(0.03183) (0.03132) (0.031)
Eleelast 0.00906* 0.0107** 0.00989**
(0.00481) (0.00427) (0.00431)
cons 30.60** 30.35* 36.08**
(15.181) (17.244) (17.390)
N 875 875 875
Rsq 0.5061 0.4757 0.5129
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
Next table depicts the results of the PCSE with individual e↵ects and the PBC ; it also specifies
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the type of error correction implemented for each model.
Table 06
Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Government Balance
Electoral variable: PBC (before and after elections)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
LDV 0.647*** 0.640*** 0.626***
(0.0499) (0.0523) (0.0549)
GDPreal 11.40* 9.955 10.37*
(5.977) (6.054) (5.8234)
GDPpc -3.927** -3.952* -4.694**
(1.9111) (2.1634) (2.1771)
Mdelast -0.000525 -0.000559 -0.00154
(0.00293) (0.0028) (0.00206)
PBC -0.327* -0.269 -0.24
(0.1907) (0.2071) (0.2075)
PBCelast 0.00878* 0.0103** 0.00966**
(0.00474) (0.00466) (0.00426)
cons 30.00** 29.81* 35.58**
(15.1823) (17.1842) (17.2853)
N 875 875 875
Rsq 0.5071 0.4774 0.5145
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
From table 06 we observe the coe cient of our interaction e↵ect between PBC and the elastic-
ity, the di↵erence from the results of Table 05, is that the PBC variable considers the e↵ect before
and after the elections. Given this last result, we may think the e↵ect before the elections is stronger
when considering the elasticity as it is evident from model 08 that if it is not the case, the coe cient
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has the opposite sign. The PBC’s coe cient of  0.327 indicates that there is a negative e↵ect
on the government balance when considering four quarters before and four quarters after elections
take place; in fact, the government should be on average, 0.327 smaller than the other quarters not
considered as PBC.
Given that our interaction e↵ect between one of the electoral dummies and the elasticity of
money demand turned significant in all PCSE models, it is valuable to remember that the coe cient
of a two way interaction e↵ect indicates the number of units that the slope of fiscal manipulation on
the electoral year, changes according to the elasticity measure. Hence the value of 0.0107 from model
06, for Elepelast means that the way in which fiscal manipulation behaves during an election year
will be a↵ected positively given the measured elasticity. But this e↵ect is just considering the in-
teraction?s coe cient. When considering all the coe cients of the interaction e↵ects regression and
comparing them with those only considering the ?main e↵ects?, there are major di↵erences as the
latter models estimate relationships averaging across all levels of the other predicted variable, while
in the ?product term? models, conditional relationships are estimated, centered in a specific value
of the other independent variable included in the interaction e↵ect (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003:24).
To contrast the specification for the models in Tables 05 and 06, and as a measure of robustness,
we decided to estimate the model but without individual e↵ects. Still, the results turned to be pretty
similar from the ones just analyzed from Table 05 and 06.31
Broadly, these results seem robust: the interaction of PBCelast along with the interaction
ofEleelast are consistently positive and significant. Meaning there is a significant relationship be-
tween the Md elasticity and the level of government balance, during electoral periods. Still, we
cannot say this is overwhelmingly conclusive as the electoral dummies did not reflect a significant
relation with our dependent variable, with the only exception of model 06.
Looking at these results and considering a political perspective, we may say there is evidence
that the fiscal balance from Latin American governments behave di↵erently when elections approach
31Result tables are depicted in appendix 04 and 05 respectively.
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context conditioned to the behavior of each country’s elasticity of money demand. Incumbents will
not try to influence the fiscal balance when doing so can be expensive because money demand will
react even with a small change in the interest rate, hence, an expansive fiscal policy would have no
e↵ect.
1.5 Final Remarks
The Political Business Cycle theory states that there is a predictable pattern in fiscal policy, as
an incumbent’s term in o ce starts with relative scarcity in the first years of governance but ends
with a larger expenditure right before elections as voters take the pre-electoral economic situation
as an indicator of government’s performance. But could it be expected that there will be the same
pattern of government spending (before elections) and timing to start manipulating in countries
with di↵erent characteristics?
We argue that fiscal manipulation is arbitraged by the contextual variable of fiscal policy ef-
fectiveness, which is determined by a time and unit specific set of economic conditions. In this
sense, given the context of the recent economic crisis, which a↵ected globally in di↵erent ways and
scales, the PBC theory becomes an important tool to analyze and understand recovery policies and
subsequent changes in the political environment because it help us defining policy reaction func-
tions. Hence, it may contribute to the resurgence of the academic debate related to the return of
Keynesian policies. It should be noticed that leading economies as the USA and the UK experienced
elections during the turbulent period of 2008-2010 that resulted in changes in o ce. Even though
both countries were experiencing much of the same disease and were forced to execute monetary
policies like quantitative easing, their fiscal policies were not homogeneous and varied from tax ex-
emptions, expense reductions or augmented levies on some products.
Despite the scope of this assessment was not centered on the e↵ects of the crisis in specific coun-
tries nor an evaluation of recovery policies, it may become a contribution to further work. It was the
purpose of this study to contribute to the discussion of the PBC topic, by estimating the magnitude
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and significance of the political business cycle moderated by Md elasticity. The evidence found
timidly favored the hypothesis of the existence of the PBC in Latin American countries, not only as
a pre-electoral fiscal expansion, but also having an e↵ect on the periods after the election takes place.
Nevertheless, there are three important considerations for further research. Firstly, this was
mainly a domestic economy exercise, as the relationship between di↵erent countries was only cap-
tured through the net exports component of GDP. It would be of great significance to do a similar
exercise including external variables such as exchange rate and trade openness. Secondly, we believe
the level of debt is crucial when considering Latin American countries. As said by Kaplan and
Thomsson (2016), politicians still operate according to the standard electoral logic, assuming voters
respond to economic conditions, but their incentives change when their governments are deeply in-
debted to global bond markets. And thirdly, each country’s institutional context may condition the
existence of PBC.
A smaller flaws from this study that should be considered for future research is the quarterly
PBC calculation that was done by Streb and Garofalo as the method applied may embrace lots of
information, which can obscure its precision. In addition, the selection of how to measure the fiscal
policy e↵ectiveness may not be the most faithful, it could be that politicians take into account other
measures, i.e the fiscal multipliers from neo-Keynesian models.
This research has the advantage of o↵ering a better accuracy for the moment when elections
take place; there is a di↵erence if elections are in February or December, which is imperceptible if
the e↵ect is measured with a yearly dummy variable. Because there was an omitted variable bias
problem, it may be thought that the other domestic factors, which influence the incentives and
constraints on fiscal manipulation, should be included.
The analysis showed a comparatively large within variation among the sample of variables; as a
result, a more detailed study of time (considering di↵erent time periods, for example) could provide
valuable contributions. Additionally, the quarters from the 80’s decade present lots of missing values,
especially for Peru and Paraguay, so making subsamples could give a richer analysis. Other possible
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source of problems may arise from determining the context-conditional circumstances relevant for
the analysis. As mentioned and observed from the economic and political context given, each coun-





Political Business Cycle Theory: first and second generation models
First Generation Models
The traditional opportunistic model, utilizes the long term Phillips curve, LRPC, when ⇡t = ⇡et ,
the inflation rate is equal to the expected inflation rate, and a short run, SRPC, when⇡t⇡ = ⇡t 1⇡et .
With the assumption that quantities respond more rapidly to changes than prices, the govern-
ment could manipulate the macroeconomic forces to reduce unemployment in the short run without
worrying of the inflationary e↵ect that comes afterwards. If voters ignore future inflation, the de-
crease in unemployment must provoke a raise in the number of voters for the incumbent party,
increasing its chances for re-election. There is further advantage in countries in which the gov-
ernment has some discretion in choosing the election date, as the party in power may ensure that
elections occur under favourable economic conditions.
It can be observed that if elections are in period t+1, the incumbent can expand aggregate
demand by manipulating monetary or fiscal policy, AD, going from point A to B. In B, inflation is
greater than expected, ⇡t+1 > ⇡t = ⇡et+1, and growth is above the natural level, yt+1 > y
⇤. The
election will take place at the end of period t+1, with high growth and inflation increasing quietly.
The model represents the theoretical argument that before each election, growth will be higher
and unemployment will be lower than normal, with a subtle increase in inflation. After elections,
a more considerable increment on inflation that will be reversed generating a recession. Alesina et
al (1997, p. 22) characterize this economic cycle as ine↵ective, as it creates volatility without any
gains, it may increase average inflation without positive returns in average growth or unemployment.
Rational Opportunistic Models
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Whether governments are able to manipulate certain circumstances in order to get a positive
growth result is the main debate in the literature of PBC. The study has evolved from myopic vot-
ers, as stated above, to a context with rational voters where they take the pre-electoral economic
situation as signal of government’s performance; if they produce an election year expansion, they
demonstrate their governing ability.
The ability to remain o ce clearly will depend on the ability to achieve the policies, which
maximize the utility of those who elect them, a small group, a single individual or all the popula-
tion. This situation can be interpreted as a principal-agent problem, where decisions influencing the
welfare of one individual or group (the principal) are taken by someone else (the agent); in this case,
the voter would be the principal and the elected the agent. The key question is how the actions of
the agent can influence the decision of the principal.
Through elections, the agent who is more competent and/or whose objectives harmonize those
of the electorate will be chosen and those who fail to accomplish them will be punished. Trying to
signal as much competence as possible, policymakers’ behaviour leads to a political business cycle,
these are the second-generation models. In this case, voters’ rationality acts as a constraint on how
opportunistic politicians can be; hence, the cycles in these models compared to the first generation,
have a shorter life, are smaller in magnitude and are less regular.
There have been di↵erent formalizations of this concept; in order to compare the assumptions
of both generations, Persson and Tabellini’s (1990) version is reviewed as it has a more direct re-
lation with the Phillips curve argument. Following Rogo↵ and Sibert (1988) many variants of the
rational voter / opportunistic PBC model have appeared; the main di↵erence is based on the ability
to manage the economy. Even though, they predict, as the myopic voters models, that governments
will increase spending, run deficits, or maybe create some inflation prior to elections.
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Appendix 2
O cial exchange rate annual change
Figure 1.6: Latin America - local currency per US dollar, period average
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Appendix 3
Distribution of annual GDP at quarterly frequency Source: Streb et al (2011:28)
Quarterly GDP data is available for a few countries during short periods in the International
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF, so we disaggregate annual GDP data at quarterly frequency
using import data.
Real GDP and imports in constant dollars are I(1) series, while their first di↵erences are I(0).
In general, the residuals of the unrestricted regression in levels of real GDP against real imports
follow a random walk, but when the first di↵erences of these variables are used the null of a random
walk can be rejected according to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests.
Hence, we follow the approach proposed by Fernandez (1980) when the residuals of the re-
gressions in levels are non-stationary, but the first di↵erences are stationary. The methodology is
to apply the distribution technique of Denton (1971) to construct a high frequency series from a
low frequency series, which is solved by minimizing a quadratic loss function, using the sum of the
squares of the di↵erences between the first di↵erences of the series to be estimated and the first
di↵erences of the high frequency series, subject to the constraint that the sum of the variations of
the estimated high-frequency series must add up to the actual annual variation. To distribute yearly
real GDP on a quarterly basis, the coe cients of the restricted regressions of real GDP against
imports in dollars, deflated by the US CPI, were used.32
As to nominal GDP, it is first deflated by the CPI and then distributed using imports in dollars,
deflated by the US CPI. The use of the CPI to deflate the nominal series is dictated by its availability
on a quarterly basis. With our quarterly estimates of real GDP, the CPI is used to construct the
nominal GDP series. The annual sum of the estimates of nominal GDP di↵er from the original
series, so we apply a correction factor using the ratio between the estimated nominal GDP and the
nominal GDP reported by the IFS to divide the estimated series. This correction factor insures that
the annual sum of the estimated series adds up to the actual annual figure; to make sure there were
32These coe cients were estimated using the MATLAB package.
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Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Government Balance
Electoral variable: PBC (before and after elections)
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
LDV 0.706*** 0.658*** 0.685***
(0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
GDPreal 8.636 7.402 6.95
(6.0119) (6.0658) (5.8623)
GDPpc -0.0503 -0.0483 -0.0406
(0.04367) (0.05138) (0.0493)
Mdelast -0.000763 -0.000831 -0.00168
(0.00294) (0.00279) (0.00211)
Ele -0.292 -0.182 -0.166
(0.29872) (0.33595) (0.34036)
Elep 0.244 0.174 0.123
(0.2897) (0.32485) (0.3281)
Elepelast 0.0043 0.0127 0.0106
(0.03264) (0.03186) (0.03182)
Eleelast 0.0102** 0.0120** 0.0115***
(0.00488) (0.00476) (0.00442)
cons -0.98** -1.227* -1.453**
(0.55335) (0.63769) (0.6418)
N 875 875 875
Rsq 0.4884 0.4537 0.4834
Indiv E↵ects No No No
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
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Appendix 05
Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: Government Balance
Electoral variable: PBC (before and after elections)
Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
LDV 0.707*** 0.687*** 0.687***
(0.046) (0.049) (0.051)
GDPreal 8.844 7.44 7.147
(5.9781) (6.0371) (5.8376)
GDPpc -0.0514 -0.0494 -0.0418
(0.04355) (0.05103) (0.04912)
Mdelast -0.000647 -0.0000655 -0.0016
(0.00291) (0.00277) (0.0021)
PBC -0.395** -0.319 -0.298
(0.19295) (0.21309) (0.21212)
PBCelast 0.00996** 0.0116** 0.0113***
(0.00481) (0.0047) (0.00437)
cons -1.082** -1.202* -1.442**
(0.54073) (0.62278) (0.62726)
N 875 875 875
Rsq 0.4899 0.4555 0.4853
Indiv E↵ects No No No
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
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Chapter 2




This paper estimates for the first time the macroeconomic e↵ects of exogenous fiscal policy shocks
in Costa Rica using a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model. The model follows the three
variable SVAR framework proposed in the seminal paper on this topic by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). We do this in order to examine the dynamic responses of output and determine if fiscal
expansive measures (increasing spending or reducing taxes) have a positive e↵ect on Costa Rica’s
economic growth. Implicitly we will also be testing one of the assumptions of the Political Budget
Cycles (PBC) theory; fiscal policy is a tool the incumbent has to create a PBC. We use quarterly
data from 1991 until 2009.
2.1 Introduction
Markedly after the financial crisis of 2008, the debate among economists about the impact of
fiscal policy on the economy grew significantly. Governments have decided to implement impor-
tant stimulus programs even though empirical research results lack consensus on the e↵ectiveness
of fiscal policy as an economic stimulant. The two well-known theoretical streams on the matter
maintain their fundamentals and support in the discussion: the neoclassicals maintain the idea that
government spending has di↵erent e↵ects than those predicted by neo-Keynesian models, as empir-
ically, on several occasions private consumption and GDP increased significantly while government
spending was severely cut. The e↵ects on consumption and real wages are the opposite; for the
neo-Keynesians, these will increase as their models consider not only the labor supply shift because
of the wealth e↵ect but also a shift on the labor demand curve as the aggregate demand increases
(real wage increases).
This study intends to provide further evidence on the characterization of the dynamic e↵ects
of shocks in government spending and taxes on economic activity. Evaluating these e↵ects is an
essential input for any political economy decision. In case of a recession, it is necessary to determine
if fiscal policy, defining its impact and timing, can be a suitable instrument. We implement a struc-
tural VAR approach, which is widely used on this literature, but generally for developed economies,
mainly because of the di culty of obtaining complete and good quality data for other countries.
For an emerging economy as Costa Rica, the e↵ects of its fiscal policy have never been estimated
individually.
Fiscal policy in the context of developing economies remains relatively understudied in the lit-
erature. To estimate the dynamic e↵ects of fiscal policy shocks on the Costa Rican economy, we will
examine the dynamic responses of output, and determine if fiscal expansive measures (increasing
spending or reducing taxes) have a positive e↵ect on Costa Rica’s economic growth. Implicitly we
will also be testing one of the main assumption of the Political Budget Cycles theory, PBC, which
states that political incumbents can a↵ect the economy through fiscal policy. The few existing studies
are an important platform even though they remain open to criticism on the basis of methodological
1
grounds (i.e.using annual data).
It is just lately that this topic has gained a particular importance, not necessarily because of
its theoretical development but because of its empirical implications. It was with the financial crisis
of 2008 that some countries, as those in the European Union, realized fiscal policy was the only
instrument governments had to impact the economy and respond to external shocks. Even though,
this impact is not the same for every country; what empirical evidence has shown is that country
specific characteristics may alter the fiscal policy’s capacity of having an impact on the economy.
For example, Costa Rica has Constitutional mandates and several laws that set expenditure
targets which have turned its fiscal situation somewhat rigid as generally, these mandates were cre-
ated without a correspondent financing source and represent approximately 40% of government’s
expenditure. We support the argument that the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy must be measured from
a perspective considering these specific characteristics. Therefore, we are aiming to contribute to the
debate by characterizing the dynamic e↵ects of shocks in government spending and taxes on output
in an emerging economy with a history of fiscal imbalance and legal constraints. Also, with our
results we would determine if the empirics support the Keynesian theory or not, while considering
the weight of the legal framework on the multiplier. By the end of the study we should be able to
determine if fiscal policy is an e↵ective instrument for the Costa Rican government to implement as
an answer to external shocks or with electoral purposes.
The structural VAR approach implemented by Blanchard and Perotti (2002:1330) has been
the common standard to answer these questions. There are mainly two reasons for the selection
of this approach. First, fiscal variables move for many reasons, of which output stabilization is
rarely predominant; there are exogenous fiscal shocks with respect to output. Second, decision
and implementation lags in fiscal policy imply that, at high enough frequency there is little or no
discretionary response of fiscal policy to structural contemporaneous movements in activity. Thus,
with enough information about tax and transfer systems, we can estimate the automatic e↵ects of
structural movements in activity on fiscal variables, and by implication, obtain estimates of fiscal
policy shocks. Having identified these shocks, we can then trace their dynamic e↵ects on GDP and
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its components. Knowing how the variables respond to government spending shocks helps us with
the analysis of the e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy in a developing economy.
Results of Blanchard and Perotti (2002:1331) show government spending shocks as having a pos-
itive e↵ect on output, and positive tax shocks as having a negative e↵ect. The size and persistence
of these e↵ects vary across specifications and sub periods; yet, the degree of variation is not such as
to cloud the basic conclusion. It is part of the development of this research to propose a di↵erent
identification process to contrast with the one used by the authors and evaluate the robustness of
the main conclusions.
Evaluating the size of fiscal multipliers often depends on having quarterly data to identify the
exogenous fiscal policy shocks, our Costa Rican sample goes from the first quarter of 1991 until the
fourth quarter of 2009. For the system of equations, we achieve identification modifying some of the
restrictions outlined by Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
As a subsequent objective, knowing the fiscal policy e↵ectiveness in Costa Rica or any other
country through the e↵ect of its multiplier in the short term, implicitly allows us to test the main
assumption of the PBC theory: is it possible for the incumbent to manipulate the economy’s output
through fiscal policy? According to Drazen (2000:2), if voters respond to good economic conditions,
they are more likely to vote for the incumbent, if an expansionary fiscal policy provides higher
growth. However, even if good economic conditions help an incumbent’s chances of reelection, it is
not very clear if fiscal manipulation per se will be e↵ective to create these conditions or if politicians
have the technical knowledge on the topic to be an advantage. This research will deal with the former.
Therefore, we would add to the utility of fiscal multipliers its valuable input to the incumbent
when choosing between the tools they may have to influence the economy within the electoral tim-
ing. Still, we are not assuming politicians will use this technical analysis, but it would be helpful as
input for their decisions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section II presents the theoretical background, to
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be followed by a brief characterization of Costa Rica’s economy, specifically variables a↵ecting fiscal
policy or its multiplier. The methodological issues are presented in section IV, including the main
specification of the model and its identification. Section V discusses the data and the econometric
analysis, while section VI concludes with a brief summary of results, its implications for Costa Rican
public policy and material for further research.
2.2 Literature Review
The importance of properly identifying the role of exogenous government spending shock on
the economy is immense. In policy making, it is vital for a government to assess the impact of its
spending in order to define the e↵ectiveness of its fiscal policy and implement it properly. In this
order, knowing the size of fiscal multipliers is essential. And, even though the importance of fiscal
policy has never been argued, the e↵ects it has on economic activity in sign and magnitude varies;
di↵erent research has shown opposite conclusions which rely on a wide range of key assumptions.
Fiscal policy has di↵erent e↵ects on growth when considering the short, medium or long run.
In general, in the short run the e↵ects are felt through the aggregate demand, while in medium or
long run they work through aggregate supply. There are multiple contrasting theoretical models on
the topic, as the Keynesian and neo Keynesian predict responses from fiscal policy on aggregate
consumption and demand, hence GDP, while the neo classical expect null or even negative e↵ects.
An expansive fiscal policy under the Keynesian view would boost consumption and private invest-
ment, therefore, a shift on the aggregate demand would follow. Under the neo classical view, the
same expansive fiscal policy, would decrease consumption, as only the structural policies can have
an e↵ect on aggregate demand. Also, if there is an inflation target, there would be a pressure on
prices that would raise interest rates a↵ecting private investment.
Within economic theory, the e↵ects of fiscal policy on growth will depend on the considered
time horizon, the assumptions on the behavior of economic agents and the credibility of the deci-
sions taken by government. The traditional neo Keynesian theory assumes a medium time horizon,
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with myopic agents who will not consider the government’s (public sector) inter temporal budget
constraint on their decision making process, idle capacity in the economy and rigid wages. Broadly,
it would be expected a positive public spending multiplier, larger or equal to one in the short run if
the spending is financed with the same amount of taxes.
On the other hand, the neoclassical theory assumes rational consumers, infinite horizon, an
agent’s inter temporal budget constraint which considers the one of the public sector and take con-
sumption decisions with long run perspectives (Modigliani’s life cycle theory and Friedman’s perma-
nent income theory). An increase in government expenditure today would come with an increase in
taxes in the future, meaning the present value of the disposable income would not change. As agents
foresee this scenario, there are no changes in their consumption. Therefore, fiscal policy is neutral
(Ricardian equivalence), independently on how it is financed, an increase in government expendi-
ture has no e↵ect over consumption or GDP. Theoretical estimates derived from general equilibrium
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models such as Baxter and King (1993) generally strengthened this view.
There is another kind of models which consider non linearities, for example Sutherland (1997)
considers that agents will behave in the Keynesian manner when the public debt stock is low and
di↵erently when there is an excessive debt level that threatens future generations with insolvency.
The non linearity comes from the probabilities of the public sector’s insolvency, if it is low, individ-
uals will not consider the possibility of tax increments in the near future, but if it is high, they save
as a tax increase would be imminent.
When considering the empirical evidence on the topic, the picture is not consistent either. In
general, positive short term output multipliers from expansive fiscal policies, expenditure expansion
or tax cuts have been the result of structural macro models and VAR analysis, but the evidence
shows di↵erent results (in magnitude and duration), and has been developed within di↵erent frame-
works. For example, Romer and Romer (2008) found that a change in fiscal policy of one % of GDP,
increases GDP by an amount close to 1% and by as much as 2% or 3% when the e↵ect peaks a few
years later. Giuliodori and Beetsma (2005) and Beetsma et al. (2006) have explored the e↵ects that
domestic fiscal shocks exert on foreign exports in the EU countries, finding that trade spillovers are
5
significant. Corsetti and Muller (2006) identify fiscal shocks for the US, Canada, the United King-
dom and Australia, concluding that twin deficits phenomena are more limited in relatively closed
economies and with less persistent fiscal shocks. On the other hand, there is evidence of negative
fiscal multipliers from Perotti’s (2004) research on OECD countries.
With U.S. data, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) found that expansionary fiscal shocks increase
output. Following a direct expenditure shock, private consumption reacts positively and private
investment reacts negatively. The identification method proposed by them has also been applied to
U.S. data in Perotti (2002), who uses a five-variable VAR, which includes GDP, the GDP deflator,
government direct expenditure, net revenue and the interest rate.
In contrast to developed economies, where a wide variety of studies can be found, research
on developing economies is not as broad. Still, this does not make a di↵erence when looking for
consensus on empirical results, as from the literature available we observe di↵erences in magnitude,
duration and sign. From structural macro models, Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007) considered the
disaggregated expenditure finding that public investment in education and total expenditure on edu-
cation are the only items which had a positive correspondence with economic growth. Research from
Chile’s fiscal policy by Cerda et al.(2005) contradicts the standard Keynesian theory results, with a
negative multiplier. They state their result as part of the evidence for the theoretical argument that
with a fiscal expenditure increment, individuals anticipate larger taxes on the future and therefore,
reduce permanent income which translates in decreasing private expenditure and GDP. But Gualu
(2013) shows that an increase in government spending would lead to a short-lived expansion of out-
put and consumption, an immediate deterioration of net exports and an appreciation or no e↵ect
on exchange rates for nine developing countries1; all fiscal multipliers are greater than one.
Estevao and Samake (2013) find that, di↵erently from advanced economies, fiscal consolidation
in low income countries has only a small temporary negative e↵ect on growth while raising medium
term output. Iltzetzki et al.(2013) appeal to the economic heterogeneity and sustain that the impact
of government expenditure shocks will depend on key country characteristics (level of development,
1Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia and Uruguay.
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exchange rate regime, openness to trade and public indebtedness). With a dataset of 44 countries2,
they found that the output e↵ect of an increase in government consumption is larger in industrial
than in developing economies; that the fiscal multiplier is relatively large in economies operating
under predetermined exchange rates but is zero in economies with flexible exchange rates. They
also found that fiscal multipliers in open economies are smaller than in closed economies and are
negative in high-debt countries.
A general drawback in the studies for developing countries is the quality of the data as in many
of them, quarterly data is recently available, therefore time series are quite short. Many researchers
have decided to use interpolated annual data leaving out significant information on the real behaviour
of the variables considered. In fact, as stated by Iltzetzki et al.(2013:242) the use of quarterly data
that is collected at a quarterly frequency is essential for the validity of identifying assumptions used
in SVAR models. In addition, data reported at a quarterly frequency but collected at a annual
frequency may lead to spurious regression results.
Even though there is some research on developing economies, data availability is scarce for a
full panel of Latin American economies. In fact, Costa Rica has almost never been part of a sample;
from our knowledge there there are two studies which include Costa Rica as part of a panel of devel-
oping economies and then, there is a paper from IMF (Estevao and Samake, 2013) which estimates
the fiscal multiplier for Central American countries but with annual data. The panel estimations,
are a doctoral thesis by Mouhamadou (2014:60), who develops a panel SVAR approach and states
that the government spending shock is persistent and its impact on GDP is quasi simultaneous,
positive and lasts relatively long. Secondly, there exists a working paper by Contreras and Batelle
(2014) who estimate fiscal multipliers by using a GMM estimator and lagged dependent variables as
instruments in the SVAR model finding a positive and larger fiscal multiplier in developing countries
in comparison to high-income economies.
Estevao and Samake (2013:4-5) state that for the first time in pertinent literature, they esti-
mate short and medium term fiscal multipliers for Central American countries3. They depart from
2Does not include Costa Rica.
3Among others in the sample
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) but because of data limitations they use cointegrating techniques to
identify key terms in the vector autoregression’s (VAR) variance-covariance matrix; specifically, they
used structural vector error-correction model, SVECM, techniques. Their results for Central Amer-
ica, suggest that fiscal consolidation hurts output only in the short term. Their spending multipliers
range from  0.01 in Nicaragua to  0.44 in Panama. For Costa Rica, the response of output growth
to current expenditure4 impact multiplier was  0.044 and the cumulative had a result of 0.7626.
The models that have used the SVAR framework have di↵erences specially on the way each
identifies a fiscal policy shock. According to Castro and Hernandez (2007:1006) these approaches
can be summarized in four:
• identification of fiscal policy shocks by using dummy variables to capture specific episodes
such as military build ups (Vietnam, for example) done by Burnside et al.(1999); Ramey and
Shapiro (1998); Edelberg et al.(1999).
• Impose sign restrictions on the impulse response functions as Faust (1998), Mountford and
Uhlig (2002),
• identification of fiscal shocks shocks based on a Choleski ordering, as in Favero (2002) or Fata’s
and Mihov, (2001),
• finally, by exploiting decision lags in policy making and information about the elasticity of
fiscal variables to economic activity as has been done by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), and
Perotti (2004).
Estevao and Samake (2013) added a fifth approach which takes into consideration the longer-run
properties of fiscal variables, economic activity, among others that enter the VAR model, generally
in the form of vector error-correction model (VECM). They state that this approach can be seen as
an extension of the Blanchard and Quah(1989) methodology.
We follow Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002) seminal approach, employing a three-variable VAR,
which includes GDP, government direct expenditure and net revenue. Its methodology has been
4Considering other variables for debt feedback and financial constraints. For more information about it, refer to
Estevao and Samake (2013).
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widely applied in the literature as it was the first analysis that solved the identification problem,
associated with earlier stylized facts on the co-movement of spending, taxes and income (Kuckuck
and Westermann, 2013). Also, since SVARs require only a minimum set of assumptions, it is a sim-
ple methodology to apply to di↵erent data sets. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) used quarterly data
to be able to make the assumption that government expenditure does not respond to the cycle, and
estimate tax elasticities a priori to account for the cyclical response of taxation to the business cycle.
As said by Borg (2014:6) this methodology has been utilized quite considerably in country-specific
studies, and is generally accepted as a valid starting point in a context where literature about fiscal
multipliers in a particular country is at its infancy. This is certainly the case for Costa Rica.
With the above as background the aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the e↵ectiveness
of fiscal policy on GDP for an emerging economy such as Costa Rica and test implicitly the main
assumption of the Political Budget Cycle theory. This theory’s conclusions are based on the possi-
bility and e↵ectiveness the incumbent has to manipulate results in the economy by using available
tools, such as fiscal policy.
This theory relies on the findings of Kramer (1971) and Nordhaus (1974). After Kramer’s (1971)
research5 on the relation between economic conditions and election outcomes, Nordhaus (1975:187-
188) developed a model of economic cycles determined by political cycles, which was called the
Political Business Cycle model, PBC. He argued that the basic di culty in making inter-temporal
choices in democratic systems has to do with the high discount rate for future consumption, as the
implicit weighting function on consumption has positive value during the electoral period, but is zero
or very small in the future. One of his main conclusions had to do with the predictability pattern of
policy, as an incumbent’s term in o ce starts with relative scarcity in the first years of governance,
but ends with a larger expenditure right before elections.
Whether governments are able to manipulate their fiscal policy in order to get a positive growth
result within the electoral period is the main debate in the literature on PBC.6 The empirical evi-
5He regressed votes received by the incumbent party to growth rate of real per capita income and the inflation
rate for that year. He found that the votes going to the incumbent party were inversely related to the inflation rate
and positively related to the growth of income.
6Refer to appendix 1 for a reference of the results for short term fiscal multipliers in emerging market economies
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dence is diverse, even when the studies are for the same country. Therefore, testing if the available
manipulating tool for the incumbent, fiscal policy, is e↵ectively a↵ecting output seems like a rele-
vant finding to complement the debate within the PBC theory. If fiscal policy is very e↵ective or
not would be a valuable piece of information for incumbents when deciding how to manipulate the
economic results with electoral purposes.7
2.3 Background Empirical Model
2.3.1 The VAR Model
Vector autoregressive models (VAR) explain the endogenous variable solely by their own history
and deterministic regressors. They are set as a system where each variable is regressed on a constant
and on k of its own lags as well as on k lags of the other variables; each equation in the VAR will
contain the same set of determining variables (Gottschalk, 2001). In its basic form, a VAR consists
of a set of K endogenous variables yt = (y1t, ..., yKt)0. The VAR(p) process is then defined as,
yt = A1yt 1 + ...+Apyt p + ut (2.3.1)
with Ai are (K x K) coe cient matrices for i = 1, ..., p and ut is a K dimensional process with
E(ut) = 0 and time invariant positive definite covariance matrix E(utu0t) = ⌃u (white noise).
Our basic VAR specification is
Yt = A(L)Yt 1 + Ut (2.3.2)
where Yt ⌘ [Rt, Gt, Xt]0 is a three dimensional vector in the logarithms of quarterly taxes (Rt),
spending (Gt), and GDP (Xt), all in real, per capita, terms.8
A(L) explicitly defined is A(z) = A1+A2z+ ...+Apzp 1 and Ut ⌘ [rt, gt, xt]0 is the correspond-
(EME) and low income countries (LIC).
7This does not mean we assume incumbents are as informed as to know which are the fiscal multipliers and based
on them make their decisions, but it would definitely be interesting to consider a model (within PBC) with informed
and not informed policy makers.
8To express the variables in real terms, GDP deflator was used.
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ing vector of reduced-form disturbances, which in general will have nonzero cross correlations, which
means there is an orthogonality restriction. A(L) is a distributed lag polynomial that allows for the
coe cients at each lag to depend on the particular quarter q that indexes the dependent variable.
The AB Model
The structural VAR (SVAR) departs from the reduced form VAR model; a VAR(p) model can






It is assumed that the structural errors, "t, are white noise and the coe cient matrices A⇤i for
i = 1, ..., p, are structural coe cients that di↵er in general from their reduced form counterparts.
A SVAR model can be employed to identify shocks and trace them, and specifying unique impulse
responses by imposing restriction on the matrices A and/or B. Therefore, according to the imposed
restrictions, three types of SVAR models can be distinguished: A, B and AB models. We will focus
on the latter which considers the restrictions simultaneously of both models, A, and B9. From the A
model we consider that there are instantaneous relations between the observable variables directly.
And from the B model, we include the interpretation of the structural part of the changes or shocks
of the observable variables. Therefore it is common to identify the structural innovations "t directly
from the forecast errors or reduced form disturbances ut.
For the AB model, a simultaneous equations system is formulated for the errors of the reduced
form model rather than the observable variables directly. Thereby the model accounts for the
shift from specifying direct relations for the observable variables to formulating relations for the
innovations (Lutkepohl, 2005:364). In this model we arrive at,
Aut = B"t
9The A model sets the B matrix to be IK and the minimum number of restrictions for identification is K(K 1)/2.
The B model sets the A matrix to IK and the minimum number of restrictions to be imposed for identification is the
same for the A model
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where "t ⇠ (0, IK). We get from the above equation that,
ut = A
 1B"t
and hence, ⌃u = A 1BB0A 1
0
. Where the two matrices A and B have K2 elements each. Thus, we
need additionally 2K2   12K(K + 1) restrictions to identify all 2K2 elements of A and B, at least
locally. From our symmetric variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form shocks, we have six
distinct parameters, which can be used for the estimation of our A and B matrices.
There are however, nine free parameters to be estimated in both A and B after imposing 10s
on the diagonal of A. This is a common practice in SVAR models and is a form of normalization of
the system. As well, if the diagonal is restricted to ones, with the A model, then a globally unique
solution is obtained (Lutkepohl, 2005:359). Which is fundamental in order to be able to reflect
isolated shocks in the components of Ut.
SVAR models have been widely used for the analysis of monetary and fiscal policy transmission
mechanisms as they allow a shock analysis, which is the closest approximation of a controlled ex-
periment available in empirical economics. Reverse causality can be a concern in these models, but
it is not an issue because by tracing the dynamics of the system to a structural shock, the causality
is pinned down by the identification process to go from fiscal policy shock to the other variables in
the model (Gottschalk, 2001:26-27).
2.4 Costa Rica and its fiscal policy
From empirical literature and a theoretical point of view, there is no consensus on the size of
fiscal multipliers for emerging markets and low income countries,10 or even an idea if they should
be expected to be higher or lower than those of advanced economies. Still, there are some economic
factors which may influence the result upwardly or downwardly. According to IMF’s technical note
(2014:5) the factors that may increase fiscal multipliers are:
10Refer to appendix 1.
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• Consumption smoothing behavior is less prevalent when: liquidity constraints arise in less
developed financial markets and, agents are less forward looking if there is too much instability.
• Monetary policy response is less e↵ective.
• Automatic stabilizers are lower.
• When government debt tends to be lower.
On the other hand, factors which a↵ect in a decreasing manner the multiplier are:
• Precautionary saving may be larger in a more uncertain environment.
• Ine ciencies in public expenditure management and revenue administration.
• Some countries may sustain lasting positive output gaps due to supply constraints.
• Economies are smaller and more open.
• Higher interest rate spreads
The aim of this section is to characterize most of these factors for the studied country in order to
understand its context and evaluate the results obtained while providing the necessary information
for further comparison with other papers/countries on the subject.
Costa Rica has been a constitutional republic sin 1949 and it is known as one of the most
stable democracies in Latin America. According to the OECD’s latest assessment on Costa Rica
(2016:6),11 in the past three decades, real GDP per capita has nearly doubled, as the economy has
evolved from a rural and agriculture-based economy to one with high value-added industries linked
into global value chains. The process of opening up to international trade and attracting foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) that started in early 1980s has diversified the country’s production structure,
boosted exports and labour force utilization. As it is a small open economy,12 shocks to its trading
partners, notably the United States, will have an important impact on growth, though its limited
exposure to China (5% of exports) protects it from the import decline of that country. The output
11OECD Economic Surveys, Costa Rica, February 2016.
12As seen in appendix 02.
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gap has moved within a range between  3% and 2%.13
The country’s financial market, evaluated through the financial development index estimated
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has improved during the las two decades as there are
more financial institutions, there is better institutional access and an improved e ciency. In com-
parison to other emerging markets, there is good institutional access (ATMs and bank branches pero
100, 000 adults) but a lower institutional e ciency (high interest rate spread, high overhead costs
and high net interest margins). Also, the country is behind on institutional depth due to the low
level of credit to GDP as well as small mutual fund and insurance industries. Actually, according to
(2016), Costa Rica’s financial development is below the predicted levels given its income per capita,
government size and macroeconomic stability.14
Virtually universal health care,15 pension and primary education systems16 have led to relatively
low infant mortality, long life expectancy (close to 80 years) and low poverty by Latin American
standards. Costa Rica is one of the pioneers in universal access to primary education in Latin
America. Spending on education amounts to 6.9% of GDP and there is a constitutional mandate
to raise it to 8%.17 The historical commitment to education has translated into high literacy rates
and almost full enrollment in primary education.
As we know, to fulfill all these goals which impact development, growth, inequality and social
inclusion, fiscal policy has public expenditure, taxes and debt, which are required to be properly
managed by the pertinent institutions. Hence, there are factors from political economy, institutional
capacity, fiscal sustainability and e ciency costs from taxes and debt which can limit fiscal policy’s
e↵ectiveness. That is why this section intends to provide a more detailed discussion of Costa Rica’s
characteristics. It is important to understand its context for evaluating the results of this research
and for further comparison with other papers on the subject.
13Annex 03 reflects its behavior.
14Refer to appendix 04 for a graphical reference.
15ranks similar to the OECD average in health and environment.
16Education stands out for its large gap with OECD countries.
17In the OECD, only some Nordic countries and New Zealand spend a higher share of GDP on education
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Figure 2.1: Costa Rica - Government Expenditure
Public Finances
Costa Rica has what has been described as an inflexible government expenditure structure.
According to its Treasury approximately 34% of its budget corresponds to constitutional mandated
spending and 23% to legal mandate spending. About 92% of these mandates are allocated in the
health, education, security and social protection sectors, which are key for the country’s development
strategy. The Education Ministry and the Judiciary Power represent 75% of all mandate spending.
The other 25% goes to the Social Development Fund,18 the National Roads Council,19 municipal-
ities, social security pension fund,20 and the National Child Welfare Agency.21 Although, when
looking closely, it is evident that it is spent mainly in wages; not the most productive component.
This behavior is extrapolated to the total central government’s expenditure structure, its major
components are wages and transfers. Another significant determinant is interest payment. These
three major expenses represent more than 80% of total expenditure. Central government spending22,
between 1991 and 2006, represented from 11% to 13% of GDP, while in 2009 it was 14.6%.
18Fondo de Desarrollo Social y Asignaciones Familiares (FODESAF)
19Consejo Nacional de Vialidad (CONAVI)
20Regimen no contributivo de pensiones de la Caja del Seguro Social
21Patronato Nacional de la Infancia (PANI)
22without interest payment
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Figure 2.2: Costa Rica - Government Revenue
It is evident from our next graph that the government’s revenue comes mainly from taxes,
specifically from indirect ones. Its tax level is close to the Latin American average but substantially
lower than in OECD countries. Social security contributions account for about 34% of total gov-
ernment revenue, against 18% in Latin American and 27% among OECD countries. Tax evasion, a
narrow tax base and low marginal tax rates a↵ect the contribution of income taxes and VAT.23 A
large amount of personal income is not taxed since the tax-free threshold is around twice the average
wage in the private sector.
Because of the di↵erence between revenue and expenditure, Costa Rica has significant fiscal
deficits. Most of which has been financed through internal and external debt which has represented
as much as 40% of GDP for some years. From our sample, the country only experienced a superavit
in the year 2007 and 2008 (0.56% and 0.18% respectively).
There is another vital characteristic to consider from Costa Rica’s government finances: its
public sector is highly fragmented, resulting in the Legislative Assembly approving less than half of
23The current standard VAT rate is 13%, considerably below the 19.1% average rate for OECD countries
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Figure 2.3: Costa Rica - Fiscal Balance
total public sector expenditure. As stated in OECD’s latest assessment on this country, spending
from agencies with some degree of autonomy, namely deconcentrated and decentralized institutions
and public corporations is not subject to parliamentary approval. The yearly budgets of these insti-
tutions, as those of the public corporations, are approved by the Comptroller General, and approval
is from a legal rather than a policy standpoint. In addition, there is no e↵ective mechanism to ensure
that these agencies’ objectives are aligned with those of the central government.
In summary, Costa Rica’s fiscal stance has some structural weaknesses such as high debt lev-
els (with respect to GDP), high dependency on income from few sources, low tax burden, strong
dependance on indirect taxes and an excessive rigidity of its expenditure structure. Given these
characteristics and their e↵ect on fiscal multipliers, we are expecting a small fiscal multiplier for
Costa Rica. Still a formal analysis is needed in order to conclude if this is true.
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2.5 An Empirical Approach
It is quite di cult to empirically-evidence the causal relation between fiscal policy and economic
growth not only because the level of complexity between variable interactions but because of the
di culty on having satisfactory measures of them. Spending and taxes typically react automatically
to the business cycle through so-called “automatic stabilizers.” Still it is non disputable the influence
the level and composition of government expenditure and income have on the macroeconomic cycle
and on the GDP’s trend. Hence, to estimate fiscal multipliers it is necessary to isolate fiscal policy
shocks from the initial influence of economic conditions, Estevao and Samakae (2013:6).
In addition, data availability limits the scope for estimating multipliers. The VAR approach
relies on the existence of reliable data over a long period of time. Government expenditure and
taxation a↵ect GDP, as they are not independent, to estimate the e↵ects of one, it is necessary
to include the other. Hence, we consider a budget breakdown between expenditure and revenue.
Ideally, government spending would consider total purchases of goods and services and its revenue
would be taxes minus transfers (including interest payments). Costa Rica’s data availability is lim-
ited, but we were still able to collect a quarterly dataset of government expenditure and revenue.
Even though we found monthly data, for the purposes of this research we will use the quarterly
sample, as a shock in fiscal policy is assumed, will take longer than a month to have an e↵ect on
GDP.
This research seeks to investigate the fiscal policy transmission mechanism in Costa Rica dur-
ing the period 1991-2009, by estimating the quantitative impact using output multipliers. In line
with the fiscal multiplier literature, a fiscal shock is defined as a random unanticipated discretionary
shock. The primary fiscal policy experiments included in this paper are shocks to government ex-
penditure, and to tax revenue.24
After careful analysis of the literature and the availability of data in Costa Rica, the identifi-
cation strategy employed is a SVAR approach a la Blanchard and Perotti (2002). We estimate a
24does not include transfers: net-taxation
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three equation SVAR model even though in the literature there are larger systems25, but because
the number of restrictions required increases with the size of the system and there is not a clear way
on how to define these restrictions and the economic theory they would follow, we decided to only
include the three main variables without imposing a predetermine theory. With this approach, we
are not only following the seminal paper but trying to overcome one of the main criticisms to the
SVAR models: the widespread use of informal restrictions may give rise to data mining.26 Also, this
methodology is generally accepted as a valid starting point in a context where there is few (or none)
research on fiscal multipliers in a particular country.
2.5.1 The Data
The variables specified in our baseline VAR model include real government expenditure, real
government income and real GDP. Public Finance Statistics, in Costa Rica, have gone through some
methodological changes through time, with the purpose of being more standardized according to
international norms. Its downside is that every time a new methodology is implemented, the previ-
ous one is discontinued, making data series not matchable and short lived. That is why the longest
quarterly data existing on government expenditure goes from 1991 until 2009 and is provided by
Costa Rica’s Treasury O ce.27
The methodology of this data series is cash flow based, therefore, central government income
(or total taxes) sums all indirect taxes as sales and consumption, direct taxes as personal tax and
corporate profits, and specific taxes as those on banana and co↵ee exports. Central government ex-
penditure considers consumption of goods and services and capital investment (including transfers
for public and private sector). All three variables are going to be in per capita terms and logged.
The population and consumer price index statistics are from Costa Rica’s National Statistics O ce
(INEC).28
25considering exchange rate regimes, inflation targeting objectives, debt levels, trade openness, among others.
26For example, an eight variable model may imply twenty eight restrictions to identify the impulse response functions
and there is no clear or explicit way in to define them and the economic theory they should follow.
27In Spanish, Ministerio de Hacienda.
28Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censo.
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As stated before, Costa Rica’s government expenditure is inflexible, therefore we calculated the
portion of expenditure which is consumption of goods and services and how much they represent
from the total government expenditure, as we are interested in the part of the expenditure which
can be changed with certain easiness by the incumbent. As well, we considered the revenue without
transfers.
From the characterization of the previous section, we know that Costa Rica has tended to have
a negative fiscal balance in the years of the sample. This imbalance has turned to be one of Costa
Rica’s most important problems as income structure has not changed, by any major political reform,
but expenditure has kept increasing. This expansion in expenditure comes from the great number of
legal and constitutional mandates which create an end-use for financial resources but do not create
the correspondent source of income. Therefore, more than two thirds of this country’s expenditure
is defined by law or constitutional mandate, or goes to pay wages.
The descriptive statistics of each variable are presented in Table 01, based on real and per capita
terms.
Table 1
Time Series Summary of Statistics
Variable Expenditure Revenue GDP
Mean 3.188 4.025 4.918
Median 3.167 4.010 4.912
Maximum 3.477 4.286 4.912
Minimum 2.996 3.853 4.796
Std Deviation 0.096 0.106 0.068
Skewness 0.922 0.517 0.276
Kurtosis 4.013 2.354 1.999
Observations 76 76 76
2.5.2 Identification
A crucial issue, as mentioned, in the estimation of a structural model is the identification of the
empirical model. As stated by Lutkepohl (2005:364), a simultaneous equation system is formulated
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for the errors of the reduced form model rather than the observable variables directly. Thereby, the
model accounts for the shift from specifying direct for the observables to formulating relations for
the innovations. Following Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002:1333) identification methodology, we have
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g
t , and e
x
t are the mutually uncorrelated structural shocks that we want to recover. As part
of the identification process an orthogonality restriction is imposed, which according to Bernanke
(1986:52), the intuition behind it relies on the fact that the structural innovations are exogenous,
unobservable for the econometrician and do not have common causes, hence, it is natural to treat
them as approximately uncorrelated. Which does not mean that there is no contemporaneous cor-
relation between the variables in the model. Structural innovations will be, then, the driving force
behind the stochastic dynamics of the variable in the model. Illustrating these restrictions and their





















These equations represent the reduced form disturbances which have little or no economic sig-
nificance, but reflect the linear combination of the underlying structural tax, spending and private
consumption shocks. We are interested in computing the impulse response functions given by the
response of the model to a standard deviation shock to the structural innovations. This is why
we normalise the standard deviation shocks to correspond to unit innovations; following that the
variance covariance matrix is assumed to have the form ⌃e = I. Gottschalk (2001:20) emphasises
that the normalisation is only about the scaling and nothing of substance is altered.
In the first equation from the system above, we observe the relation between structural move-
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ments and our variables of interest. In general terms, impulse response analysis has shifted from
specifying the relations between the observable variables directly, to look and interpret the structural
part of their changes or shocks. In SVAR models the dynamic relationships within the economy are
modelled as a relationship between shocks; they intend to model the structural changes on Yt. For
example, equation 3.2 states that structural movements in taxes within a quarter or month, rt, can
be due to three factors:
• the response to unexpected movements in GDP, captured by a1xt
• the response to structural shocks to spending, captured by a2egt , and
• the structural shocks to taxes, captured by ert
The second equation from the system has a similar interpretation, which applies to structural
movements in spending. Lastly, the third equation states that structural movements in GDP can be
due to structural movements in spending or in taxes, or to ext . As stated, there is an identification
problem with this type of models (di↵erent structural models can give rise to the same reduced form)
and therefore, additional assumptions (also called identifying restrictions) are needed. To identify
this system, we followed an identification less restrictive than the one from Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) as we let the VAR determine as many coe cients as possible by imposing the least number
of restrictions on the model.
First, we have that the parameters a1 and b1 capture two di↵erent e↵ects, the automatic e↵ects
of fiscal policy on output under existing policy rules, and the discretionary adjustment in fiscal
policy given structural events within the quarter. The key here, for identification, is to recognise
that using quarterly data practically eliminates the discretionary channel, as it takes more than a
quarter to learn about a GDP shock, decide a fiscal policy response, pass the measure through the
legislative power, and then, if approved, implement it. Thus, to construct a1 and b1, we need the
elasticities of government expenditure and of taxes on output.
Conejo et al.(2011) estimated the tax elasticity,29 and its subdivision, the indirect and direct
taxes elasticity to output for Costa Rica by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and a detailed
29Considering total income from taxes
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cointegrated model for long run elasticities, along with an error correction model for the short run
dynamics. Their sample includes the same years as our database, from 1991 until 2009. They ar-
rived at a value equal to 1.11 for the long run and 0.72 for the short.30 Therefore, for both model
specifications we are assuming that the response to structural movements in taxes, a1 = 0.72.
For b1, we could not identify an automatic feedback from economic activity to government
purchases of goods and services as the country from our sample has a very inflexible government
expenditure structure. Also, when relative volatilities for government expenditure have been esti-
mated, the outcome shows that the government expenditure is lagged from the growth cycle of the
economy given the tax collection system and the indebtedness levels. Therefore, we assume the
response to structural movements in GDP to be equal to zero, b1 = 0. For this assumption there is
also support from the tests performed by Born and Muller (2012) and Beetsma et al. (2009) where
they provide evidence that government spending will not react to output within a year, mainly
because budgets are defined for a year. Besides, any modification to the budget within a quarter
would probably be relatively small.
Second, to estimate a2 and b2 there is no clear way of distinguishing if the taxes respond to an
increase on expenditure or the reverse, when the government increases taxes and spending at the
same time. Therefore, there are two alternative assumptions: one is to assume that tax decisions
come first, so a2 = 0, and we can estimate b2; the other, is to assume that spending decisions come
first, so b2 = 0, and we can estimate a2. We tried both specifications and for all models b2 was found
to be not significant. Hence, we assume b2 = 0.
Third, we allow for c1 and c2 to be estimated by the system, as we have the three restrictions
needed for the system to be just identified. This is a di↵erence from Blanchard and Perotti’s (2002)
model identification, as they used the estimates of a1 and b1 as instruments to estimate c1 and c2
in a regression of xt on rt and gt, as they are no longer correlated with ext .
31 In Blanchard and
Perotti’s model, the coe cients a3, b3 and c3, are assumed to be equal to one.
30They used the log of GDP as their tax base.
31This is possible as we have that r0t ⌘ rt   a1xt and g0t ⌘ gt   b1xt = gt; thus they can be used as instrumental
variables.
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Based on Spilimbergo et al. (2008) there is evidence that results of fiscal multipliers may depend
on the variable identification, therefore, we decided to have a less restrictive model letting the system
of equations to estimate these coe cients as well. In general, for the identification of our model we
stand believing that when imposing values there has to be certainty that they are correct, because if
not we would be restricting a variable behavior that can harm the estimations of the whole model.
We follow a Cholesky decomposition where government spending can a↵ect all the variables in
the system contemporaneously, shocks to the revenue will only a↵ect real GDP the current period.
Since output is ordered last, we assume it has no contemporaneous e↵ect on any of the other two
variables. Even though the Choleski decomposition is fairly popular within this kind of model, it
is just one possible strategy for identification, and should only be done when the recursive ordering
implied in the model is supported by technical considerations as in the present case.
With these identifying restrictions, we have the important advantage that they are quite gen-
eral, and therefore are compatible with the broad spectrum of economic theories behind the relation
between fiscal policy and other economic variables. Actually, it helps us to discriminate between
competing theories.
2.5.3 Econometric Analysis
We start our analysis with some pre-specification tests for each variable. As we know, in a
non-stationary time series, its expected value at time t to be determined by the expected value
taken at t0, causing estimation problems.32 Broadly, generating results with appropriate standard
errors requires the variables to be stationary.
On this matter, we conducted the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, with
trend and drift. From our three dependent variables, we did not reject the null, until it was dif-
ferenced. When testing for cointegration, the null hypothesis of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test
32Cointegration would be needed.
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on the disturbances was not rejected for all three cases. The presence of unit roots suggests the
possibility that variables may be cointegrated. Table 02 presents the results for each of the tests.
Table 2
Unit Root Tests for each series, p-values
Expenditure Revenue GDP
Phillips-Perron 0.0031 0.9977 0.9999
Trend 0.0049 0.0000 0.0166
First di↵erenced 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Augmented Dickey Fuller 0.8769 0.9760 0.9985
Trend 0.0001 0.3456 0.0061
First di↵erenced 0.0001 0.0000 0.0142
Di↵erencing may appear as the decision to make, but there are di↵erent views on whether the
variables in a VAR model need to be stationary. Enders (2004) and Sims et al.(1990), for exam-
ple, recommend against it, arguing that the goal of a VAR analysis is to have a su ciently rich
estimation rather than determining specific coe cient estimates. Enders (2004) state that using
di↵erenced variables when they are cointegrated is problematic as it throws away the information
inherent in the cointegrating relationship; which leads to a misspecification error, making inference
invalid. Following this approach we can find the VAR model of Mountford and Uhlig (2009). On the
contrary, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), incorporate deterministic (including time and time squared
as regressors) and a stochastic trend (using first di↵erences) in their model.
Given the results reported in Table 02, we decided to test for statistical significant cointegration
between government spending and revenue, using the Johansen’s test. Under the trace test we did
not reject the null of no cointengration, which means that there is no linear combination between
these variables that yield a stationary process. Under the maximum eigenvalue test, we do not reject
the null either. When we include all variables we rejected the null for both test specifications, mean-
ing that there is a significant cointegration relationship.33 As part of the analysis we also depicted
the residuals to determine if they had a unit root. Considering all results and keeping in mind the
33Results may be seen in annex 05 and annex 06.
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purpose of this research, we decided to keep the variables for our model in levels, with a logarithmic
transformation and in real and per capita terms.
Following, we conducted the lag order selection criteria test for the model specification were a
quarterly dummy was included to control for seasonality. The Schwartz information criteria suggest
two lags, while the Hannan-Quinn suggested three and the Akaike six lags. The outcome by the
Schwartz criterion suggested fewer lags due to the way they penalize the inclusion of higher order
lags. As it is a consistent criterion and because of e ciency on the estimation, we are implementing
this lag length rather than the suggested by the Akaike or Hannan-Quinn. The reason why we are
obtaining these di↵erent results comes from the way of treating our seasonality. If we do it in a
deterministic way, we include the dummies, therefore the lags do not have to control for it. While
if we do it an stochastic way, we do not include the dummies but would have to include more lags
in order to control for it. We work with a seasonal dummy.
The stability condition for a VAR model implies that the variables in the model will be non-
explosive; it is determined by the roots of the characteristic equation. Our model is stable as all roots
lie within the unit circle.34 This evidence on stability supports our decision of not di↵erentiating
our variables despite the results on the unit root tests. The LM test to check serial correlation on
each lag, did not reject the null of no serial correlation for the third lag with a probability of 0.6411.
As we stated before, the inclusion of the lags would take care of the stochastic seasonality as well,
but still we include a dummy for the fourth quarter for seasonality control.





Expenditure 1 0.2637  0.0021 0.0103
(0.1046) (0.0464) (0.0226)
Expenditure 2 0.5106  0.0733  0.0317
(0.1092) (0.0485) (0.0236)
GDP 1  1.2464 0.6446 0.8192
(0.5833) (0.2589) (0.1259)
GDP 2 1.6572 0.4126 0.0639
(0.5114) (0.2269) (0.1103)
Revenue 1 0.4247 0.3643 0.115
(0.2057) (0.0913) (0.0444)
Revenue 2  0.5390  0.0945  0.0354
(0.2057) (0.0913) (0.444)
DQ4 0.0820 0.0739 0.0143
(0.0170) (0.0076) (0.0037)
R-squared 0.6820 0.9492 0.9705
Adj. R-squared 0.6482 0.9439 0.9673
Given this characterization we look through our impulse response functions, IRFs, of the VAR
model, to trace out the impulse (e↵ect of an exogenous shock in one variable) on the dynamics of
all other variables in the system. The magnitude of the shock is set to be one standard deviation of
the variable. Hence, a 1% shock to spending produces a small e↵ect on GDP of 0.634% within the
same quarter, which apparently stays on those bounds for the rest of the period considered. Even
though we have arrived at these results with the VAR specification, they can only be satisfactory if
our underlying belief is that growth, revenue and expenditure do not a↵ect each other in the same
quarter. As we are not sure about this, we estimate a structural VAR model. As before, our esti-
mation of the SVAR model will consider all variables in levels, and will include a seasonal dummy,35
and two lags in accordance to the Schwartz lag length criterion.
35Appendix 07 evidence the need of controlling for seasonal e↵ects, and appendix 08 shows the Impulse Response
Functions when controlling for seasonality.
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Implementation of Structural VAR models is far from uniform and there exists an extensive
literature debating how it should be done. As explained before, the identification process is remark-
ably important as it can throw significant di↵erences in results compromised on its specification. In
fact, Stock and Watson (2001) conclude that the VAR methodology can be successful in capturing
the dynamics of data but that their structural implications are only as sound as their identifica-
tion schemes. Then, our priority is to include the least number of restrictions and let the system
identify most of the coe cients, imposing the minimum number of restrictions by ourselves. The re-
strictions included are based on theory and available data (as explained in the identification section).
As we saw above, the restrictions of our model are a1 = 0.72, b1 = 0, a2 is unknown and there-
fore, will be defined by the system, as well as c1, c2, a3, b3 and c3. The coe cient b2 will be set





















Keeping in mind the restrictions depicted above for the AB Model, the results can be observed
in Table 04.
Table 4
Structural VAR Estimates - SVAR just identified
Coe cient Std Error Prob.
c(1) 0.0912 0.0536 0.0887
c(2)  0.6340 0.2371 0.0075
a(3) 0.0566 0.0047 0.0000
a(2)  0.0056 0.0066 0.3945
b(3) 0.0120 0.0010 0.0000
c(3) 0.0245 0.0022 0.0000






















From the table above we can observe that the estimated coe cients are significant, with the
only exception of a2. From our model specification, the coe cients of main interest are c1 and c2
as they reveal the response on output from unexpected movements in fiscal variables. Coe cient
c1 represents the response on output of unexpected movements in revenue, while c2 does it but
for expenditure. Therefore, these results show that there is a negative response in GDP when an
unexpected structural movement in expenditure takes place. And there is a positive response when
it comes from revenue or taxes. Our next figure shows the impulse response functions for this model
specification in a period of four years. In the graph, shock 01 stands for a shock from expenditure,
while shock 02 represents the unexpected movement in revenue.
Figure 2.4: SVAR model - Impulse Response Functions
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The impulse definition comes from structural decomposition as we are interested in obtaining
the accumulated results to estimate Costa Rica’s fiscal multiplier. Through the IRFs it is possible
to explore this reaction a bit more into the future. As an example we set four years as the time
period of the graphs above. We then observe what happens to the dependent variable when there is
a one standard deviation shock given to the residual of the independent.
Figure 2.5: Impulse Response Functions from a shock on expenditure
When looking at sixteen quarters it is not clear is the e↵ect of a shock in expenditure on GDP
is explosive, but as we can see in our next graph, when considering 45 quarters the response appears
to go back to the initial level. Still, given the confidence intervals, only the first two periods after
the shock have a significant result.
As part of a robustness check, we checked di↵erent lag lengths, seasonal dummies, and did
another estimation considering the elasticity of sales tax to output, as it represents 35% of Costa
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Rica’s revenue approximately. Therefore the restrictions for our second model are a1 = 1.37, b1 = 0,
a2 and b2 are set as unknowns. The results can be observed in the next table.
Table 4
Structural VAR Estimates - SVAR over identified
Coe cient Std Error Prob.
c(1) 0.2162 0.0536 0.0012
c(2)  0.6326 0.2371 0.0170
a(3) 0.0616 0.0051 0.0000
a(2)  0.0106 0.0072 0.1428
b(3) 0.0120 0.0010 0.0000
c(3) 0.0274 0.0030 0.0000
The results obtained, are very similar to the ones obtained before in terms of sign and signifi-
cance and magnitude. Also, they are in line with those obtained with the straight VAR model. A
one % shock on spending produces a significant impact response in output of 0.6326 within the same
quarter. Figure 07 shows the impulse response functions for this model specification for a period of
four years, 16 quarters.
With these results we can estimate Costa Rica’s government spending multiplier. A general
definition of fiscal multiplier is that it is the relation that describes the e↵ects of changes on fiscal
instruments on GDP; it is the ratio of the change in real GDP to the change in the fiscal balance
(Coenen et al., 2010:10). Hence, fiscal multipliers measure the short-term impact of discretionary
fiscal policy on output.
2.5.4 The Spending Multiplier
There is a wide variety of definitions for fiscal multipliers. A general one, would be that a
fiscal multiplier is the change in real output given a unit increase in a fiscal variable. Thus, we
would have that for our research the spending multiplier is the change in real GDP caused by a one
unit increase in government fiscal policy. Thus, the fiscal multiplier measures the e↵ect of a 1USD
change in spending (or a 1USD change in tax revenue) on the level of GDP. Following Mountford and
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Figure 2.6: SVAR model - Impulse Response Functions
Uhlig (2009) and Iltzetzki et al.(2013:244), we focus on two specific fiscal multipliers. The impact
multiplier would measure the e↵ect of a one unit increase in government spending at the time of the








where t can be a quarter or a year depending on the frequency of the data that is used in the
study. The overall multiplier describes the output response to an unspecified fiscal shock, while the
revenue (spending) multiplier relates output to a discretionary change in revenue (spending). The
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scarce literature, on emerging economies or low income countries, empirically estimating the multipli-
ers suggest that they are normally smaller than in advanced economies (Estevao and Samake, 2013;
Ilzetzki and others, 2013; Ilzetzki, 2011). There is some research with negative multipliers, espe-
cially when considering long periods through time and when public debt is high. IMF (2014:6) state
that the fact that emerging economies’ spending multipliers are lowet than in advanced economies,
could be related to several factors including expenditure ine ciencies and the di culties to unwind
expenditures.
Costa Rica’s expenditure multiplier turned out to be equal to zero for the first period, then
equal to 0.0001 for the second period and afterwards it turned to be small and negative, and not
significant. This result must be a consequence of two main characteristics of its public finances:
debt level and public expenditure management and revenue administration.Interestingly, the rev-
enue multiplier is significant; its values are within a range between 0 and 0.6321 on period one and
period 45 respectively.
Comparing this results to the ones from the emerging economies literature there is no much
variance.
Figure 2.7: Costa Rica - Debt level as percentage of GDP
A said by IMF (2014:7), high debt countries generally have lower multipliers, as fiscal consol-
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idation is likely to have credibility and confidence e↵ects on private demand and the interest risk
premium. Also, having di culties in collecting taxes and/or expenditure ine ciencies limit the
e↵ectiveness of fiscal policy on output. For Costa Rica, it would be needed to reduce mandated
spending and revenue earmarking in order to have a budgetary process more flexible in responding
to unexpected shocks. In 2014, around 70% of central government expenditure was mandated by
constitutional and other legal provisions; this, plus, debt servicing, leave only about 17% of the
Central Government’s budget for discretionary spending (OECD, 2016).
With these results we may say that for a Costa Rican incumbent manipulating fiscal policy
before elections may not have the expected results. Given the estimated multipliers, probably it
would not be felt by the voters in terms of output in the short run. Hence, fiscal policy is not an
e↵ective tool within the PBC theory.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has estimated a fiscal VAR for Costa Rica in order to have a clearer idea of the
e↵ects discretionary fiscal policies may have on this nation’s output. We based our model on the
seminal paper of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) as it is the one of the few estimations done for this
country. By following their methodology we believe give our results a leveled field for comparison
within the literature. A small and negative multiplier reflects the low impact a shock from fiscal
policy may have on output and flags one of this country’s structural dilemmas on public finance: the
extensive use of revenue earmarking and mandated spending. Reducing budget rigidities is neces-
sary and could be complemented with the introduction of performance budgeting (based on output
targets), for the government to regain fiscal policy e↵ectiveness.
From our research and the existent literature on this topic, we can state that a simple fiscal
multiplier does not exist. Its size, duration and sign will depend on several factors that can be
external or within the economy. From Coenen et al. (2010:8) we know that fiscal actions are more
e↵ective when the fiscal instrument is spending or well-targeted transfers, and when in addition
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monetary policy is accommodative. On the other hand, permanent stimulus, that is a permanent
increase in deficits, is much more problematic because it leads to a long-run contraction in output,
and substantially reduces short-run fiscal multipliers.
Iltzetzki et al. (2010) use a structural VAR model to model a panel of 44 countries (exclud-
ing New Zealand) to show that the impact of government expenditure shocks depends on several
country-specific factors. The results show that fiscal multipliers are larger in industrial rather than
developing countries. They also find that the multiplier is relatively large in economies operating
under fixed exchange rate but zero in economies operating under flexible exchange rates. Fiscal
multipliers in open economies are found to be lower than in closed economies and in high-debt coun-
tries are also small. Since New Zealand is a small, open economy with a floating exchange rate, our
findings fit with the stylized result that the output multipliers from fiscal policy are likely to be small.
Even when the SVAR approach allows us to have an empirical estimation, a problem with this
type of models is that there are many possibilities for omitted variable bias to be present and of
course, reverse causation. We tried to neutralize these caveats with the structural form, but still
there can be some misspecification from the original model. For example, we can observe from the
empirical studies that there is no consensus on the identification strategy.
A major concern with the SVAR methodology is the orthogonality restriction for the structural
shocks. In the case of a bivariate model, the orthogonality restriction is based on the assumption
that there are only two fundamental sources of shocks, which is di cult to justify when considering
variables that can have an e↵ect on both the supply and demand side of the economy, for example.
This concern would suggest to model larger systems of equations, but the restrictions needed for the
identification would increase as well, which is another concern in itself.
The widespread use of informal restrictions may give rise to data mining. As mentioned by
Gottschalk (2001:33), since informal restrictions are often not made explicit by researchers some
care is warranted when interpreting impulse response functions. He mentions that the frequent find-
ing of the SVAR literature stating that monetary policy shocks have no long run e↵ects on output,
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may not be as precise because the underlying line of reasoning may su↵er from circularity, because
the long run neutrality of money is exactly one of those restrictions that may be used informally to
specify the model in the first place.
%tal vez agregar lo que hemos hecho para que no sea el caso nuestro
According to Favero and Giavazzi (2007) the impulse response estimated in VAR studies of
fiscal policy shocks are all biased. The reason for this is that these studies do not consider the debt
dynamics that arise after a fiscal policy shock. Still, as we are focusing on the unanticipated shocks
and short term dynamics we consider that our results do not have the mentioned bias.
The followed approach in this chapter only estimated the average fiscal multipliers across the
sample period. Further research could extend this framework to include a time-varying setting, as
we may think that fiscal policy e↵ectiveness can change over time in accordance to a set of di↵erent
economic circumstances.
With the VAR approach we are tying our economy to a linear behavior, so if any non-linearity
applies, the VAR framework would not be adequate as its inferences would be misleading with re-
spect to the real dynamics. Including the Markov-Switching model may be an option for future
research, where within the regime the series maintain its linear behavior but there are two di↵erent
regimes as for example business cycle states.
However, we believe that better estimation and use of multipliers can play a key role in en-
suring macroeconomic forecast accuracy. Given the experience from the financial crisis, it seems as
essential to measure accurately the relationship between output and fiscal stimulus in order to plan
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Appendix 2
Costa Rica: trade as percentage of GDP
Source: World Bank Data
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Appendix 3
Costa Rica: output gap
Source: Banco Central de Costa Rica
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Appendix 4
Financial Development of Costa Rica




Johansen Test - Government Expenditure and Revenue
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Probability
None 0.1145 12.3580 0.1406
At most 1 0.0466 3.4826 0.0620
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic Probability
None 0.1145 8.8753 0.2967
At most 1 0.0466 3.4826 0.0620
Appendix 6
Annex 2.6
Johansen Test - GDP, Government Expenditure and Revenue
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic Probability
None 0.3877 50.5550 0.0001
At most 1 0.1272 14.7516 0.0645
At most 2 0.03071 2.2772 0.1313
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen Statistic Probability
None 0.3877 35.8034 0.0002
At most 1 0.1571 12.4744 0.0941
At most 2 0.03071 2.2772 0.1313
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Appendix 7
VAR - IRFs without seasonal control
Note: we represented the VAR model with four lags in order to show its seasonal behavior.
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Appendix 8
VAR - IRFs with seasonal contro
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Chapter 3
Is there a relationship between




It is well known that reelection-seeking incumbents have incentives to manipulate economic
outcomes. However, the empirical evidence has mixed results when fiscal or monetary policy are
considered as the manipulating tools for the incumbent, even for the same country. Actually, most of
the empirical evidence of the last decade has proven to be context-conditioned; part of this empirical
evidence is the model of our first chapter. That is why, for this chapter we intend to test the existence
of an indirect tool the incumbent may still have through the regulated price industries. Our theory
is based on Peltzman’s work (1976) and Paiva (1996) which reveal as a formal theoretical model that
a regulator-agency will choose the price which maximizes the political support for the incumbent
government-regulator. We show how there is a significant e↵ect of the elections on gasoline prices
(as a proxy for regulated markets) in Costa Rica, considering its monthly information from October
1986 until October 2014. We also try to generalize this finding with a panel of ten Latin American
countries that considers annual data from 2001-2012. Lastly, we contribute to the literature by
proposing a non parametric approach which supports our hypothesis on the relationship between
the prices in regulated markets and the election timing. We found a non linear pattern showing
these prices decrease before elections and afterwards, they increase.
3.1 Introduction
The Political Budget Cycle (PBC) theory has accumulated almost half a century of being stud-
ied, reviewed, modified and improved. The theory argues that a political incumbent in a country
with free elections will try to increase his or her probability of being re elected by influencing the
economic context through fiscal or monetary policy. Between both manipulating tools there will be
di↵erences in costs, implementation timing, degrees of freedom, etc. Hence, context is significantly
important when analyzing PBCs. Based on the assumption that the incumbent signals competence
through economic results, the theory expects that the incumbent starts his or her period with rela-
tive scarcity but finishes it spending significantly more, just before elections.
The empirical evidence has shown a set of mixed results. Even though during the first decades
of this theory’s validity, empirical research turned out to be supportive, as time has passed, the
existence of better checks and balances (budget rules), along with other changes, have made it more
di cult to demonstrate a consistent result on the topic, no matter if fiscal or monetary policy are
considered (as manipulating tools).The way in which the incumbents can manipulate the economic
outcome will depend on institutional characteristics, how close the Presidential race is, the inter-
national context, among other time changing variables. Hence, it is no surprise that the empirical
evidence on PBC is diverse, even when the studies are carried out for the same country. It does
not matter if you are looking at the fiscal policy tools or at the monetary policy ones. It seems
intuitive, though, that politicians would try to govern as long as possible, therefore, we have looked
for another kind of instrument, an indirect one, which is o↵ered by regulated markets.
Within the theoretical models developed in the PBC literature, there are some that have ratio-
nalized the political business cycle as the equilibrium of a signaling game originated from temporary
information asymmetry between government and voters. On this line, Moito and Paiva (2013) in-
cluded in their theoretical model the relationship between the politician’s interest in being re-elected
and the option they may have to influence the voter’s preferences through regulated prices. At the
end, the regulator would have the incentive to set higher prices when elections are far in time secur-
ing some level of profits for the firm, and lowering the prices just before the elections to generate a
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profit to the consumers who are all voters.
Price controls or reforms have been studied within their role as stabilization mechanisms in
developing economies.1 However, as said by Ozatay (2005) price controls are not only specific to
these stabilization episodes. In fact, as voters dislike high inflation there might be an incentive for
the opportunistic policymakers to control prices, as seen in monetary policy political cycles. To
our knowledge, Paiva (1996) along with Agenor and Asilis (1997) were the first who presented a
theoretical model with a tightening of price controls in pre-electoral periods.
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide significant empirical evidence of the e↵ect elec-
tions may have on regulated industry prices. For its development, we focused on two di↵erent
samples; firstly, a panel data for ten countries in Latin America with annual data (from 2001-2012)
using the price of gasoline as a proxy for the regulated industry and secondly, one which explores
the Costa Rican case. This country has the particular characteristic of having a strong regulated
market with much influence on their inflation measure. We used monthly data from 1985 until 2013.
For both cases we have obtained significant results for our variable of interest.
This chapter is presented as follows; section II describes the theoretical and empirical back-
ground for our research, followed by a detailed description of the theoretical model in section III.
While section IV provides the empirical evidence, analyzing the time series with Costa Rican data
and then the Latin American panel data. Conclusions are o↵ered in section V.
1Bu e (1998), Dornbush et al.(1990) and Edwards (1989).
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3.2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical framework for the present research comes mainly from two di↵erent streams of
models. Firstly, we rely on the development of political budget cycles theories which started more
than forty years ago with Kramer’s and Nordhaus’ research. And secondly, we include the theories
of political regulation and lobbying, to give evidence on how electoral cycles behave in regulated
industries, exploring a little deeper in what refers to political price cycles. In this section we aim
to establish all precedent theoretical and empirical arguments needed as basis for the subsequent
explanation of the scope of this work.
3.2.1 Pre-electoral fiscal manipulation
We begin with the basics of the Political Business Cycles theory, PBC, which were set formally
by Nordhaus (1975) with a model of economic cycles determined by political-electoral cycles. One of
his conclusions had to do with the predictability pattern of policy, as an incumbent’s term in o ce
starts with relative scarcity in the first years of governance, but ended with a larger expenditure
right before elections. Before Nordhaus, there had been some grasps on the topic as Kramer (1971)2
had linked economic conditions to election outcomes, regressing votes received by the incumbent
party to growth rate of real per capita income and the inflation rate for that year. His research
stated that the votes going to the incumbent party were inversely related to the inflation rate and
positively related to the growth of income.
Fair (1978) found that the change in real economic activity (real per capita gross national pro-
duction, GNP, or the change in unemployment) in election years has an important e↵ect on votes
for the incumbent president. Additionally, he found that voters apparently have a high discount
rate on past economic performance; they just consider one year or two before the election.
On these grounds research has evolved importantly through four decades, going from myopic
voters,3 to a context with rational and forward looking voters (first and second-generation models)
2He studied the percentage of the vote going to the Republican candidates for the House of Representatives between
1896 and 1964 by the state of the economy.
3Basic assumption in the first generation of PBC models; voters never learn from their mistakes; each government
lets them believe that they deviate from the long run Phillips curve, and they fall for the trick.
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where the pre-electoral economic situation is signaled as an indicator of government’s performance.
Thus, an election year expansion demonstrates the incumbent’s governing ability.4 Rogo↵ and Sib-
ert (1988), Rogo↵ (1990), and Persson and Tabelini (1990), have rationalized the political business
cycle as the equilibrium of a signaling game originated from a temporary information asymmetry
between government and voters.
The objectives for the policy-maker to remain in o ce are characterized as partisanship5 when
the incentive is to implement a specific program, and/or opportunistic6 , when the aim is to remain in
power. Although a distinction is drawn between these reasons, Drazen (2000) argued that, in order
to implement their preferred policies, partisan policymakers, may display opportunistic behavior, as
they need to be in o ce in order implement those policies. Therefore, studies on the topic consider
them as complementary and recognize combinations between opportunistic and partisan incentives.
Even though in the first decades of this theory development empirical research turned to be
supportive, as time has gone by and politicians become more sophisticated it has been more di cult
to demonstrate a consistent result on the topic no matter if fiscal or monetary policy are considered
(as manipulating tools).
The empirical evidence is diverse, even when the studies are for the same country. For example,
when analyzing the United States’ PBC, Alesina has tested, through di↵erent articles, the temporary
partisan electoral e↵ects on real outcomes. He argues,7 that because un-modeled temporary parti-
san e↵ects can look like opportunistic cycles, any empirical evidence of the latter can be discounted.
Krause’s (2005:97) research indicates that pre-election real personal income growth is significantly
higher under Republican administrations relative to Democratic. He determines that maximum
growth in US real personal income happens in the first two or three years of a term for Democratic
presidents, but the top is reached in the election year for Republican administrations. Faust and
Irons (1999), on the other hand, conclude that there is no evidence for an electoral influence in the
4O’Mahony (2010:2).
5Hibbs (1978) and Alesina (1987)
6Nordhaus (1975) and Rogo↵ and Sibert (1988)
7according to Grier (2008:337-338)
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US economy.8 They state that Alesina’s evidence is product of an under-specified regression model
and endogenous regressors. On the contrary, Grier (2008) finds a significant influence of elections
on quarterly real GDP growth when controlling for multiple lags of interest rate changes, inflation,
money growth, among other variables.
Drazen (2000) stated in his review of the PBC, that the main conclusion when talking about
the models based on monetary policy as a manipulating tool is that they are unconvincing both,
theoretically and empirically. Actually, most empirical research on this type of cycles, use a mon-
etary policy instrument or inflation as dependent on an electoral variable to test if the policy is
significantly di↵erent near elections. Under this approach, results are mixed; Alesina and Roubini
(1992), Beck (1987), Golden and Poterba (1980), and Leertouwer and Maier (2001) did not find
evidence of political monetary cycles for the U.S. and OECD countries, but Boschen and Weise
(2003), Grier (1987), Haynes and Stone (1989), and Abrams and Iossifov (2006) did.
Another approach was examined by Shi and Svensson (2006:1367-1369), who proposed a moral
hazard model of electoral competition to back up their empirical evidence which found that on av-
erage PBC are significantly larger in developing than developed countries; on average, fiscal deficits
increase 1% of GDP in electoral years. In their model, the size of the electoral cycle will depend on
politician’s rents of remaining in power and the share of informed voters. The more private benefits
politicians gain when in power, the stronger their incentives to manipulate; the more voters fail to
distinguish manipulation from competence, the higher the return for the incumbent when boosting
expenditure before elections.
Specifically, from Latin American, LA, PBC evidence for election-year economic manipulation
is mixed at best, as stated by Kaplan (2013:73). Actually, in his book, he proposes a political
austerity cycle (PAC) theory which explains that countries who rely on decentralized bond markets
should shrink their budgetary deficits, reducing inflation before elections. He even expects that past
hyperinflation episodes in LA have blurred the lines of partisan cycles. Considering sixteen LA coun-
tries he finds strong evidence that when governments heavily rely on external bond markets , the
8Opportunistic or partisan
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capital exit threat leads to budget discipline and low inflation during election periods. Eslava (2006)
examines three possible determinants of fiscal balances and finds that less-fragmented governments
and voters with greater ability to monitor fiscal policy are related to lower deficits.
The incentive for fiscal manipulation before elections exists, but from the evidence, the capabil-
ity to remain in o ce clearly will depend on the ability to implement the policies which maximize the
utility for those who elect them: a small group, a single individual or all the population, limited by
factors such as institutional constraints (i.e. weak legislatures), the cost of losing o ce, the central
bank autonomy, the level of external indebtedness and the exchange-rate regime. Therefore, there
is an important assumption, as said by Shi and Svensson (2003:68): the theory of political business
cycle requires that government’s policy instruments, fiscal or monetary, have an immediate impact
on real economy. From our second chapter we observed that this is not the case for Costa Rica;
not only the immediate e↵ect of a shock in fiscal policy was small but, it was negative. Maybe in
countries like this, regulated markets turn to be the tool for political cycles.
3.2.2 Industry regulation
As the PBC theory, Industry Regulation, has been a field of research under study for more than
forty years. In principle, their models assume regulators make their market decisions (price, entry,
etc.) under the pressure from di↵erent interest groups. The work of Stigler (1971) changed the focus
on industry regulation, stating that instead of being a way to maximize welfare, industry regulation
should be characterized as arbitrage among competing interests. His research showed equilibrium
where an organized minority, i.e. the firms, could capture the regulatory agency. This result obeyed
to a simple and intuitive reason, consumers have weak incentives to acquire information and actively
defend their interests while producers form pressure groups to influence the industry’s regulatory
outcome. Within this theoretical context, the regulatory outcome will be determined between self-
interest suppliers (regulators) and demanders (interest groups, firms and consumers).
As said by Trillas (2010) during the twentieth century and up to the present, the organizational
solution for the challenges of price and entry regulation have been through independent agencies
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as regulators. Actually, the creation of these agencies around the world, has been supported and
recommended by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to several
developing countries, claiming that it is the most e↵ective approach in the regulation of privatized
infrastructure industries (Brown et al., 2006). But still, independent regulators are part of a complex
process of power sharing.
The literature that has studied the direct lobbying9 relationship is extensive, but related to an
incumbent’s behavior, we mention Peltzman’s work (1976) as it reveals a formal theoretical model on
how a regulator-agency chooses the price which maximizes the political support for the incumbent
government-regulator. He formalizes the idea that a politically concerned regulator determines a
regulated price in trying to maximize his or her political support. On the same line, Person and
Tabellini (2000) include the e↵ect of lobbying on political decisions, giving a much more active role
to the industry.
As mentioned before, within the PBC literature, there are di↵erent theoretical models10 that
have rationalized the political business cycle as the equilibrium of a signaling game originated from
temporary information asymmetry between government and voters. Between them, governments are
di↵erentiated by their level of competency, with more competent governments providing the same
amount of services using fewer resources. Government’s competency is set as a serially correlated
stochastic variable that receives a new shock every period, providing a cause of information asym-
metry, which arises from the fact that the government learns its competency shock before voters do.
On this line and within the scope of this research, we reference Moito and Paiva (2013), who say that
in election years, the incumbent party has an incentive to act as if it had received a high-competency
shock in order to attract voters.
9The attempt to influence or get political favors via campaign contributions or other means.
10Rogo↵ and Sibert (1988), Rogo↵ (1990), and Persson and Tabelini (1990)
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3.2.3 Price Controls and Electoral Cycles
Paiva (1996) adds a time dimension to Peltzman’s (1976) model turning it into a political price
cycle (PPC) in regulated industries. Paiva’s model shows that an optimal price-regulation strategy
results in cyclical prices. In electoral and non-electoral periods, the regulator would have the incen-
tive to set higher prices when elections are far in time securing some level of profits for the firm, and
lowering the prices just before the elections to generate a profit to the consumers who are all voters.
His model is supported on an empirical test on Brazil’s gasoline market from 1969 until 1982. He
stated that a clear electoral timing, i.e. having elections every four years, facilitated the creation of
price cycles assuming that consumers have too few incentives to acquire costly information about
past prices.
As well, Agenor and Asilis (1997) researched on the interaction between price controls and elec-
toral timing. They argue that one of the rationales supporting the use of price controls temporarily
emphasizes the role these controls may have on enhancing political support; based on the premise
that the stabilization program is able to stop inflation quickly so it would not be costly in terms of
unemployment. Considering a small open economy, which produces one good and has three types of
agents: firms, households, and the government, their study showed that an incumbent will attempt
to secure the political advantage of a lower inflation rate caused by any price controls tightening
to the electoral contest.11After elections, prices are adjusted sharply toward the equilibrium value.
How intensively are price controls used by the incumbent for electoral purposes, will depend on
uncertainty about the term in o ce (i.e. the incumbent owes his position to a coalition of political
parties that may collapse at any moment).
Ozatay (2005:2) intends to answer with a theoretical model if an incumbent in Turkey can con-
trol public prices before elections to increase his/her chances of re-election. His model shows that
under domestic debt financing an incumbent can decrease the rate of increase of public prices before
elections. Having controlled and transparent processes for budget approval and implementation,
and limiting debt financing are determinants of his results. His empirical results show that Turkish
inflation rate in pre-electoral periods was kept significantly below the one of post electoral observa-
11Agenor and Asilis(1997:140).
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tions. On a similar line but proposing a political austerity cycle, Kaplan (2013:21-22) suggests that
the incumbents in Latin America accommodative fiscal or monetary policy is not set to boost the
economy’s growth, but aims the inflation to go down.
Paiva has developed his work during almost twenty years and his research, Paiva (2006) and
Moito and Paiva (2013), has contributed to the literature improving the theoretical model and
adding more empirical evidence to their hypothesis. In fact, they have given evidence of the exis-
tence of political price cycles in regulated industries for a broad sample of countries, most of them
developed.12 This is one of the main motivations of the present research, as it would be an impor-
tant contribution to add evidence from emerging economies, as are the Latin American economies
included in our sample. As we know, their country characteristics are quite di↵erent, which enriches
Paiva’s findings, complementing the overall idea of the existence of PPC. Also, we step forward a
bit further and propose a nonparametric methodology to support the PPC existence.
Based on these developments and those of industry regulation is how we build the foundations
for the present research.
3.3 Theoretical Background Model
From our theoretical background, it is clear that there is still an important development to
be done within the political-electoral cycle theory. In this section we explain the model of Moito
and Paiva (2013), which gives a clear theoretical explanation on how the regulated prices within a
country can be a powerful manipulating tool with electoral purposes. Their model gives the industry
a more active and explicit role in influencing regulators, and assumes consumer-voters are rational
and forward-looking.
As mentioned, their model includes another dimension to the regulator’s maximization problem
12Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak
Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States. As well they have included
Mexico in the panel, and done a separate time series analysis for Brazil.
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explained by Peltzman’s (1993) study. They modeled regulatory decisions as a lobbying game where
the industry and the regulator interact to determine regulated prices and campaign donations in a
dynamic setting with alternating electoral and non-electoral periods. The incentives, and therefore
the optimal strategies of the regulator, change depending on the period, generating an equilib-
rium that characterizes a political cycle in which the regulated price is lowered in electoral periods
(2013:96-97). In their model, there are three players: the government or regulator, the producers
who are the lobby-industry and the consumer, who is also a voter.
At time t, the beginning of an electoral period, the government and lobbyist negotiate prices
and campaign contributions, making a binding commitment about the prices to be set during the
current electoral period and for the period immediately after. Then, the industry decides the amount
of the campaign contributions. As explained by the authors (2013:97), there is an assumption that
consumers are not organized as a pressure group and do not know the details of the agreement be-
tween industry and regulator. Elections take place every other period. In a non-electoral year, the
incumbent government-regulator chooses the price that maximizes welfare and lobby contributions.
In an election year, however, the incumbent may lower the regulated price to increase its chance of
being re-elected.
The regulator, and its strategies, will behave di↵erently in electoral and non-electoral periods.
For the latter, there will be an incentive to set higher prices and secure some level of profit to the
firm, while for the electoral, the incentive would go the other way, lowering the prices to please the
consumer (voter). In their model, the industry plays an active role influencing the regulators and
the industry, the consumer (voter) is rational and forward looking and the government will seek to
set prices in order to maximize welfare and his chances of being re elected.
As defined by the authors, the regulator’s social welfare function is a weighted average of
consumer surplus and industry profits, with weights following a stochastic process. A shock that
determines a higher (lower) weight on profits characterizes a pro-industry (pro-consumer) type of
regulator and results in the choice of a higher (lower) regulated price (2013:97). This shock is unob-
served by consumers but not for the industry lobby, as they observe the regulator’s type during the
10
negotiations that precede the election. Even though this temporary information asymmetry gives
the chance to the pro-industry regulator to mimic the pro-consumer before elections, pro-consumers
can achieve a lower price for any given utility since deviations from the welfare plus contributions
generate a decrease in government utility at increasing rates.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the pro-consumer regulator will set a price unachievable by the pro-
industry type in order to unequivocally signal its type to consumer-voters. Unable to match this
lower price, pro-industry regulators have no reason to distort the regulated price at all (Moito and
Paiva, 2013:97-98).The order of events of this model is crucial as it is what drives the cycle,
Period (t), the incumbent receives its preference shock. Afterwards, it decides the current regulated
price, and commits to the industry about future prices. The industry then decides on the amount of
campaign contributions. The period ends when the elections take place and the winner is announced.
Period (t+1), the winner takes o ce until the end of period (t+2). The incumbent type is revealed
to the consumer as the regulator sets the price that maximizes its social welfare function plus lobby
contributions.
Period (t + 2), there is a new preference shock at the beginning of this period that sets a new ori-
entation for the incumbent. Another election will take place at the end of the period.
Therefore, periods (t + 1) and (t + 2) belong to the same mandate but to di↵erent electoral
cycles. The electoral cycle starts in t and lasts until the period immediately preceding the next
election, (t+ 1). The new independent shock in (t+ 2) resets the game.
The firm’s profit function is given by
⇡(p) = ptqt(pt)  C(qt) (3.3.1)
where ⇡(p) is the profit of the firm, pt is the price of the regulated good qt is the quantity produced-
demanded of the good and C(q) is the cost function.13The consumer’s utility function is given by
13Cq > 0, Cqq > 0.
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> 0 and  
00
< 0, ⌘ is a variable related to the government’s performance in areas other than
the regulated market that also a↵ect popularity. The superscript I refers to the incumbent. We can
think of this as all other tools discussed in the political budget cycles theory, i.e. expansive fiscal
policy. Given the prices, consumers will maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint.
It follows that,
⌘It   ⌘Ot = st + st 1 + e(cI   cO) (3.3.3)
where st is an iid stochastic variable with unimodal distribution, twice continuously di↵erentiable





2f  x  12f ,
0,otherwise
The total amount spent on a campaign prior to the election is given by cI , and e is the marginal
e↵ect on popularity of the party from a US dollar spent. Superscripts I and O refer to the incum-
bent and opposition parties. The consumer will maximize its utility subject to its budget constraint,
given prices the demand function for the good will be q = q(p) and the indirect utility Vt.
The type of politician is defined by ↵ 2 [↵,↵], with ↵, being a pro consumer type and ↵ being
a pro industry type, 0  ↵ < ↵  1. The type ↵ follows a stochastic process with probability µ of
observing a pro-industry type: P (↵ = ↵) = µ. The politician, as mentioned before, receives a shock
every election period.14A new shock at the beginning of period t will define the regulator’s type in
periods (t) and (t+ 1). A new shock is given on (t+ 2), when the next election cycle starts.
14As mentioned by Moita and Paiva(2013:99) these shocks can be thought as a greater fluidity of political arrange-
ments, coalition negotiations, government programs, campaign donations, among others.
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The incumbent’s social welfare function is
W (p) = ⇡(p) + (1  ↵)S(p) (3.3.4)
where S(p) is the consumer’s surplus. The incumbent will decide the regulated price in the two
periods that he will be in o ce15 and this price maximizes his objective function in time t:
 It = maxpt+1,pt+2
[ URA(c) + (1   ) RIt+2 +W (pt+1) +W (pt+2)] (3.3.5)
where URA(c) is the indirect utility of the independent non politician regulator,   is a binary variable
that is equal to 1 if there is an independent regulatory system and equal to 0 otherwise. R is the
probability that the incumbent gets re-elected and   is the weight the party places on being elected
relative to social welfare. As we will focus on the case of politician regulator, we assume   = 0. The
objective function becomes,
 It = maxpt+1,pt+2
[ RIt+2 +W (pt+1) +W (pt+2)]






t+2   V Ot+1 + V Ot+2]   0





t+1   V Ot+1] = Et[ (q(pIt+1 + ⌘It+1    (q(pOt+1   ⌘Ot+1]
= Et[ (q(p
I
t+1    (q(pOt+1 + st+1 + st + e(cI   c)]
= Et[ (q(p
I
t+1))]   + st + e(cI   c)
where   is the expected value of  (q(p)), c, is some base amount of campaign contribution a party
15His objective function is a finite horizon maximization problem.
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has if it is not in power, and the expectation is taken conditional on the information available to
the public in time t. When setting the price pt, the incumbent does not observe st, hence, the
probability of winning is given by
RIt = P [Et[ (q(pt+1,2(↵)))]   + st + e(cI   c)   0] (3.3.6)
which follows the probability distribution of s and RO = 1 RI . When the incumbent sets the price
he cannot observe the popularity shock, so there is no relation between the price and st. Before
getting to the equilibrium conditions is important to note that in practice, prices in t+1 and t+2
are independent while prices in t and t+1 are not.
In this model there is no history dependence and the independence of the cycles implies that no
reputation is built over time since a new shock defines a new regulator. As there is an assumption
that the regulator set the prices and then the lobby decides optimally how much it will contribute
to the politician’s electoral campaign, the politician’s decision problem is
  = max
pt+1,pt+2
W (pt) +W (pt+1) +  Rt (3.3.7)
subject to
⇡(pt) + ⇡(pt+1)  c = 2⇡c   0,
where 2⇡ is the amount of profits the industry must earn and Rt is given by equation (6).Given the




+ f [Et(S(pt+1))  S(p)] + fe(c  c) (3.3.8)
Equations (7) and (8) are used to solve the equilibrium prices. When assuming symmetric
information16 we have that voters know the regulator’s type and understand the trade-o↵ he faces.
Hence, the regulator has no incentives to distort the price in an electoral period: p⇤t = p⇤t+1.
16For this paper we are going to show the case where information is asymmetric, as it is the theoretical basis for
our empirical model. The other cases: symmetric information and Independent Regulatory Agency can be found in
Moito and Paiva (2013).
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Our interest is to focus on the asymmetric information case. Following Moito and Paiva
(2013:103) by substituting equation (8) and using the constraint on firm’s profits, the regulators’
maximization problem given by (7) can be rewritten as
  = max
pt+1,pt+2
G(↵, pt) +G(↵, pt+1) +  [
1
2
+ f(Et(S(pt+1))  S(p))  fe(2⇡   c] (3.3.9)




G(↵, pt) +G(↵, pt+1) +  fEt(S(pt+1)) (3.3.10)
Solving the model recursively, from time t + 1 to time t: when there are no elections (t + 1),
the price that maximizes the politician’s welfare and lobby contributions will be pt+1, as this is the
price the regulator had committed to with the industry when negotiating campaign contributions.
Actually it is the same as when there is full information.17 This means that pst+1 = p
⇤
t+1, where s
stands for signaling equilibrium.
For the electoral years, in equilibrium, the incumbent politician adopts a strategy according
to its type; if pro-industry, he will set ps(↵) = p⇤(↵) and  (p⇤(↵)   ps(↵)) = 0;18 if pro-consumer,
the strategy will be p(↵) < p⇤(↵) and  (p⇤(↵)  p(↵)) > 0. Any voter that assigns probability one
to being a high type, when observing p(↵) and assigns probability one of being a low type when
observing p(↵) is consistent with this equilibrium.19
The theorem20 presented by Moito and Paiva(2013:104) represents a separating sequential equi-
librium of the game as
ps(↵) = p⇤(↵)    1[ fEt[S(pt+1(↵))  S(pt+1(↵))]]






18For the proof, see Appendix A of Moito and Paiva (2013).
19Same result as Spence (1973): the least favorite one does not signal his type as he will be recognized in equilibrium.
20For the proof, refer to Appendix B in Model and Paiva (2013:104).
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where  (p⇤(↵)   ps(↵)) > 0 is the distortion of the pro-consumer type. This distortion, according
to the authors,21 is a function of the di↵erence between the probability that each type wins the
elections, of how the incumbent weights his objective function and of the variance of the random
shock on voter’s preferences:
• The greater the di↵erence between probabilities, the more distortion the lower type will intro-
duce to be distinguished from the higher type.
• The more weight the politician places on being reelected, compared to the consumer welfare,
the more he will distort.
It is straightforward, in equilibrium the pro-industry type receives more campaign contributions
from the lobby than the pro-consumer type.
From this model, the emerged equilibrium consists of fully rational political price cycle in a
regulated industry, where the incumbent lowers the price before elections to benefit the consumer
and raises it after elections to give some profit to the lobbyists. More specifically, during non-
electoral times, policy distortions because of the lobby activity will have their full dimension. While
in electoral times, they will decrease. In equilibrium, the pro-consumer government/regulator will
distort and lower the regulated price to di↵erentiate themselves from the pro-industry regulators.
Therefore, an empirical implication is that political cycles will only take place when a pro-consumer
is in o ce, which happens with probability (1  µ).
Before we review our empirical analysis, it is important to distinguish that the theoretical back-
ground model works as a general framework of reference for regulated industries, in order to better
understand the mechanism behind a PPC. But this does not mean there can not be di↵erences with
the evidence for specific sectors or countries. In fact, for our chosen sample the oil industry even
when managed by autonomous institutions are basically in hands of the public sector.22 The di↵er-
21Moito and Paiva(2013:104).
22For example, the state company in Mexico is Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), and in Brazil it is Petroleo Brasileno
(Petrobras).
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ence lies in the level of independence each of this firms may have with respect to the government.
If they are completely independent they would act as the producer/lobbyist from the model, and if
they are not, they would be part of pre electoral manipulation directly from the government. In any
case this should not a↵ect our findings as our interest is to determine if there is an electoral pattern
in the behavior of the prices of regulated goods.
3.4 Empirical Evidence
Having explained the theoretical relationship between the politician’s interest in being re-elected
and the options they may have to influence the voter’s preferences through regulated prices, it is
in our interest to provide some new empirical evidence on the topic. For this, we will focus on two
di↵erent samples, the Costa Rican case study and a panel data for ten countries in Latin America.
3.4.1 The case for Costa Rica
The case selection for Costa Rica was made because of its particular characteristic of having a
regulated market with a strong influence in their inflation measure, which is actually divided into
regulated inflation and non-regulated. We will test the political price cycle theory, considering all
regulated goods and services. We have stated that one of the options for the incumbent to manipu-
late the economy and therefore increase the probability of being reelected, comes from the prices of
the regulated markets. We found an exceptional country case as it measures through its regulated
price index the inflation that comes specifically from these goods and services. Therefore, it is an
ideal variable to determine if there is a political price cycle in Costa Rica. Its results will complement
those of Moito and Paiva (2006, 2013).
Our variable of analysis is as specific as it gets, regulated prices index, and comprises the fol-
lowing prices: water service, municipality services, electricity, gas, gasoline, diesel, rice, car technical
revision (MOT), internet, urban and intercity bus fare, taxi fare, telephone landlines service and
mobile service. All of them have a significant and almost immediate e↵ect on a household’s (voter’s)
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income. Our next graph shows their weight in the consumer’s price index.
Figure 3.1: Consumer Price Index, weighting of regulated goods and services
From an ownership perspective, we have the advantage that even though some are owned by the
state23 and others are owned privately, in terms of their weight on the CPI’s index, they are similar,
54.8% and 45.2% respectively.24 Also, the firms owned by the state were created as autonomous
institutions25 which implies they must act as such.26
As we are interested in characterizing the relationship between the regulated-prices index and
the electoral cycle, we have illustrated the behavior of the regulated markets index for the past
twenty eight years emphasizing the moments in time where elections have taken place to have a
sense of its behavior.
23Water service, municipality services, electricity, gas, gasoline and diesel.
24Considering as private does which are part of a competitive market.
25Costa Rican Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers was created in 1953 as a decentralized organism
26If not, we have already assumed that from our theoretical background model the di↵erence would come from their
level of independence which in any case would help the incumbent with its manipulation purposes for the electoral
process.
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Figure 3.2: Consumer Price Index, regulated goods and services, 1986-2014
Apparently there is a pattern of a decreasing trend of the index just before elections, which
would support our hypothesis. Still this is the first sight at the data, a deeper and statistical
significant analysis is needed. To do so, we will employ a standard regression model; in a general
manner,
yt =  jyt j +  jxj,t +  EEt +  jsj,t + ✏t (3.4.1)
where xj,t is a vector of m controls, Et is a dummy election variable, s is a seasonal control variable,
and the term ✏t is a random error that is assumed independent and identically distributed. The
variables included are: the monthly series of the regulated-prices index, the international oil price
measured in US dollars and the monthly index of economic activity. The time period considered is
from January 1985 until June 2009, for a total of 294 observations. From our hypotheses we would
expect a negative sign on the election dummy variable, Et, and for it to be significant. The electoral
variable is dichotomous, coded 1 in the month in which a regular election occurs, and 0 otherwise.
Following Streb (2011), we will also look at the pre and post electoral e↵ects of fiscal manip-
ulation. In accordance, we are able to appreciate the electoral e↵ect before and after the elections
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take place. That is why we include the variable PPC, which is equal to  1 six months before the
elections and equal to 1 six months after the elections. Given our theoretical background, a signif-
icant positive coe cient in PPC would imply that the increment in prices after elections is larger
than the decrease experienced before. Meaning for those who own the firms27 of regulated goods
or services a positive compensation for their support before elections. We would expect for this to
be the case as it would be counterintuitive for firms to accept a negative return at the end of the cycle.
Table 1 presents the general characteristics of all the variables we include in the model.
Table 01
Cross Sectional Time Series Summary of Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max
Regulated price index 294 0.12445 6.05546  14.0487 19.5043
International oil price 294 3.21647 0.54919 2.2905 4.8870
Economic activity index 222 5.04580 0.25853 4.5979 4.8870
Election month 294 0.02041 0.14163 0 1
PPC 294 0.02041 0.51555  1 1
We start with the non-stationary tests. Our dependent variable, the regulated-prices index,
regsa, rejected the null of the Dickey Fuller test at ten percent, with a value of 0.0881, but it did
not reject the null when a trend was considered. A similar behavior is observed with the economic
activity index. The logarithm of the international price of oil did not reject the null for any of
the cases or tests. Hence the decision is to include the di↵erence of international price of gasoline.
After including the international price of gasoline as di↵erenced, there is no evidence of a unit root.





Summary of Results - Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Consumer’s price index, regulated prices
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intl priceUS$  5.997  5.212  10.02**  8.963*
(3.897) (3.868) (4.927) (4.939)
Ele  7.225***  8.735***  5.648*  7.184**
(2.487) (2.561) (3.078) (3.183)
PPC 1.573** 1.566*
(0.703) (0.883)
Ec activity index  2.557  2.474
(1.593) (1.586)
cons 0.283 0.279 13.62* 13.2
(0.354) (0.351) (8.045) (8.009)
N 293 293 222 222
Rsq 0.0329 0.0494 0.0456 0.0593
Adj Rsq 0.0262 0.0395 0.0325 0.0419
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
In a time series model our major problem is serial correlation and that is why the next esti-
mations consider di↵erent lags of our dependent variable. The numbers of lags are set according
to the information criterion, and as we specify di↵erent models, the number of lags varied as well.
From all the di↵erent model specifications, we observe a constant result and it is the significance
of the electoral dummy coe cient. Also, the coe cient of this variable maintains the negative sign
in all cases, which means that during elections the price index of regulated goods and services in
Costa Rica diminishes; as the graphical evidence in the figures above depicted. This result is also
in accordance to the theoretical model, therefore it turns to be evidence for its support.
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Table 03
Summary of Results - Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: Consumer’s price index, regulated prices
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intl priceUS$  6.051  5.772  5.195  8.737*  5.89  11.42**
(3.944) (3.640) (3.908) (4.913) (4.082) (5.217)
Ele  7.114***  3.978***  8.798***  7.248**  10.85***  9.3484 ⇤ ⇤ ⇤
(2.528) (2.269) (2.592) (3.165) (2.992) (3.581)
PPC 1.814** 1.663* 2.249*** 2.400**
(0.739) (0.879) (0.0837) (0.979)






LDV.12  0.156***  0.117*  0.159***  0.118*
(0.059) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064)
cons 0.221 1.016 0.251 14.47*  0.655 12.12
(0.0366) (5.994) (0.361) (7.994) (1.287) (8.402)
N 283 222 282 222 282 222
Seasonal control No No No No Yes Yes
Rsq 0.0364 0.0485 0.0721 0.074 0.0824 0.0242
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
Our regression results support our hypothesis and the intuitive behavior we showed in figure 01.
When we look the regulated prices’ of goods and services in Costa Rica behavior within an electoral
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context we find evidence that there is a significant relation; because of its p-value we are 99% sure
about this, with exception of model 8 were our confidence is 95%. We know that coe cients of in-
dependent variables will show the relation between them and our dependent variable; the di↵erence
between an electoral and non electoral period correspond a negative e↵ect on the regulated price
index.
According to the di↵erent specifications of our model, the e↵ect has a lower value of  3.978
(model 6) and the highest of  10.85 (model 9), which means that everything the same, ceteris
paribus, the regulated price index would decrease in this amounts when we are in the considered
electoral period in comparison to other timing. In terms of the consumer price index this nega-
tive e↵ect would be translated as 0.83 and 2.28 points less when elections take place,28 holding
everything else the same. Their percentage significance will depend on the past value of the CPI,
but as an example, if we consider the highest value obtained in the model ( 10.85) and that two
months before the election the CPI was 100, we would have a drop to 97.7 on the month before the
elections. A monthly fall of 2.28% in the CPI is economically significant, hence, we could say then
that politics do matter in explaining the downward trend on the regulated price index and conse-
quently on the CPI. The next graph shows both scenarios on the pre electoral months as an example.
Having the regulated price index as our dependent variable does not allow us to distinguish
which of the goods or services or if it is one or more, that determine this negative e↵ect, but we do
know that no matter on which it is, the e↵ect is rapidly and directly felt by the consumers/voters.29
From our data characteristics, we know that the minimum value of the regulated price index
is  14.0487 and the maximum is 19.5043. With it, we have studied the relationship between our
dependent and independent variables by approximating a linear relation with the regression analysis.
But we intend to relax this linearity assumption in order to complement the results obtained using
a non parametric appraisal.
28Because the prices of regulated goods and services weight 21%, approximately, of the consumer price index.
29Annex 3 and 4 show the behavior of some of the regulated goods and services considered in the index.
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Figure 3.3: Consumer Price Index, scenarios given the model results
Non parametric approach
The next figure intends to depict this giving clearer evidence on the observed behavior. On the
x axis we have months in a particular arrangement and on our y axis we find the values for the
regulated goods price index seasonally adjusted.
The x axis represents the months before and after elections, the zero value is the actual month
in which presidential elections have taken place. The negative values on the left represent the months
before the elections and the positive values are the months after the elections. As national elections
take place every four years, in the graph we divided the data series into two. The labels represent
each of the elections, for example Ele 98 means the election of 1998. What we observe is that no
matter which election we consider, it goes down as the election approaches and comes back up as
it passes30; therefore, our interest in defining this relationship in a non parametric estimation as well.
Even when the behavior of the series is not limited to a linear standard form, we observe that
before elections, the price index of regulated goods tends to decrease. The opposite behavior is
observed immediately after elections.
30Annex 03 shows the same graph but seasonally adjusted; the relationship between election and regulated prices
maintains.
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Figure 3.4: Non parametric approach on the Index of Regulated Goods and Services
These results signal that the e↵ect before elections as the prices decrease is compensated by
their increment in the months after the election date. Theoretically, this is explained by the existence
of organized groups of the productive sector which have some influence on the regulator. Therefore,
these results along with those of the regression model seem sensible towards our hypothesis and
theoretical background model; the repetitive pattern on regulated prices before and after elections is
statistically significant when assuming linearity and when not. This evidence indicates an attempt
from the incumbent to influence electoral preferences by persuading the regulated goods and services
market, providing evidence in favor of the PPC theory. It is now our intention to generalize this
finding with a panel of ten Latin American countries which considers annual data from 2001-2012.
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Figure 3.5: Local polynomial smooth
3.4.2 Panel data analysis
We will begin with our Latin-American panel: a multivariate regression model, which charac-
terizes the relationship between the selected dependent variable (from the regulated markets), y, in







 jxj,i,t +  EEi,t +
nX
j=1
 j⇣j,t + µi + "i,t (3.4.2)
where xi,t is a vector with elements xj,i,t of m controls, Ei,t is a dummy election variable, tt is a
time control variable, µi is a specific country e↵ect, and "i,t is a random error that is assumed to be
independent and identically distributed. From our hypotheses we would expect a significant coe -
cient on the election dummy variable. This specification represents a dynamic panel model, where
the dependent variable is a function of its own lagged levels, a set of controls and the electoral timing.
From regulated markets, we chose the gasoline market as our dependent variable because when
its price changes, the e↵ect can be felt by consumers/voters almost immediately on transportation
costs (which are directly a↵ected) and in their vehicle use. Also, gasoline has an important weight
31Based on Streb et al. (2009:434).
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within CPI components of all countries in the sample. The other important fact, is that govern-
ments have a strong influence on the price of that fuel, as it is either taxed or subsidized; and it is
an homogeneous product that can be compared among the countries in the sample. There is as well,
an international price reference which is widely known and spread by the media, which is updated
on a daily basis. Hence, the natural logarithm of domestic gasoline prices in real terms will be our
dependent variable, and will be controlled by the logarithm of oil prices in real terms, meaning the
price free of any subsidy or tax; the international reference.
The election variable is a dichotomous dummy, coded 1 in the year in which a regular (presiden-
tial) election occurs, and 0 otherwise. Following Streb (2011), we will also look at the post-electoral
e↵ects of political price manipulation. Nordhaus’ (1975) framework stated that the monetary stim-
ulus before elections is compensated afterwards to avoid long run consequences for inflation.
In accordance to Nordhaus and within the theoretical model of Moito and Paiva (2013), our
hypothesis is that a decrease in the gasoline prices should be observed before elections, but after,
there should be an increment.We will test our hypothesis through a Latin American Panel and also
in a non parametric way.
The model represents in a very simple way, the relationship between the evolution by country of
gasoline prices (in real terms) to the real cost of oil expressed in domestic currency and the electoral
years in the sample. Intuitively, we want to determine if the variable part of the domestic gasoline








 jxj,i,t +  Eelei,t + µi + ⇣t + "i,t
where loil rnat is the logarithm of the national price of gasoline, lioil rdom is the logarithm of real
international oil prices in domestic currency and ele is a dummy variable as explained before. The
country specific e↵ects, are expressed by µi and ⇣t represents the time specific e↵ects; the distur-
32Following Moito and Paiva (2013).
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bances by "i,t.
Because of data availability for Latin American countries and the aim to have a standardized
source of information,33 the panel comprises annual series on the evolution of gasoline prices, in-
flation levels, measured through the CPI and exchange rates of their national currency expressed
in US dollars. Our panel is conformed by Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, from 2001 until 2012. It is a strongly balanced panel with
120 observations, out of which 27 represent election years.
Econometric Analysis
Before dealing with the classical problems of panel data such as serial correlation and unit het-
erogeneity and with the intention of avoiding other series problems, non-stationarity tests were done.
As we know, in a non-stationary time series, its expected that value at time t is determined by the
expected value taken at t0, causing estimation problems. On this matter, the Fisher test was carried
out; based on the p-value of n independent tests and considers that all series are non-stationary,
against the alternative that at least one of them in the panel is stationary. There is no evidence in
this model of a unit root neither in the original nor the transformed series as the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity was rejected.
We proceeded to estimate the model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which turned out with
our electoral dummy as significant for the year of the elections, but not significant for the year before
or after. We will consequently go through a detailed econometric evaluation of the panel in order to
define the best specification for this model.
The country sample in this panel is formed of geographically close countries but which are
impossible to think of as homogeneous. Specifically to our model, all countries subsidize or tax the
gasoline in completely di↵erent ways. In Argentina, for example, it is supposed to be tax free but
the existence of export rights distort the gasoline price with respect to the international one. In
Brazil, Petrobras (one of the biggest Brazilian refineries) cannot translate international price volatil-
33These are the countries for which The Economic Comission for Latin American Countries, ECLAC, had data
available.
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ity into the local prices. The oil national company of Chile (ENAP) refines almost 80% of the total
demand, it is100% state owned, and hence the price distortion may come from it. Therefore, even
though price movements should be caused by movements in supply or demand, when there is a tax
or subsidy, other factors distort them.
Given the Latin American context, we need to account for unit heterogeneity, which can have
three di↵erent causes: individual e↵ects, interaction variables, and omitted variables. In order to
determine its presence, an analysis of the cross sectional variation and the variance over time of the
sample of countries was made. Table 04 helps with a part of this evaluation since it decomposes the
standard deviation in two components: between and within variation.
Table 04
Cross Sectional Time Series Summary of Statistics
Variable Specification Mean Std dev Min Max Observations
National oil price overall  1.4473 0.0505  0.7484 0.1306 N = 120
between 3.1731  5.7098 3.6964 n=10
within 0.1435  1.8729  0.9435 T = 12
Intl pricenatcurrency overall 2.8215 2.9502  1.0356 8.3458 N=120
between 3.0749  0.4900 8.0444 n=10
within 0.3501 1.2209 3.6653 T=12
As expected, the between variation of the national gasoline price is much higher than the within
the same happens with the international price in domestic currency, but in this case, the e↵ect comes
from the exchange rate variation instead of the price itself. Specification tests are done in order to
determine if the estimations are going to be the best linear estimator possible according to the Gauss
Markov theorem.
The Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticitry showed a probability outcome of 0.0155, re-
jecting the null hypothesis of constant variance. The null of no omitted variable bias expressed in
the Ramsey regression specification-error test was rejected with a p value of 0.006. This can be a
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possible reason for the heteroskedasticity result. The source of this bias could be the exclusion of
individual e↵ects, which OLS does not take into account when estimating.
In accordance with these tests, we confirm that the pooled time-series violate three of the stan-
dard OLS assumptions about the error process.34 First, errors are contemporaneously correlated,
such that errors in country A at time t are correlated with errors in country B at time t. Second, the
error process display panel heteroskedasticity, meaning that the variances of the error di↵er among
countries. Third, there might be serial correlation within the same country such that errors at time
t are correlated with errors at time t+ 1.
We start with the fixed e↵ects model, which assumes that there is a one-way error component
for the disturbances of the panel, the errors uit, would be compounded by an unobservable individual
specific e↵ect, mi, and a remainder disturbance, vi. The Fixed E↵ects model specification assumes
mi, as fixed parameters to be estimated and the remaining disturbances stochastic with vi indepen-
dent and identically distributed. The independent variables are assumed independent of the vi for
all i and the null hypotheses states that all the individual e↵ects, mi, are the same and equal to zero.
The alternative specification of the Fixed e↵ects, the Random e↵ects model was tested as well.
The di↵erence is that it assumes mi random, and independent from vi, in addition, the explanatory
variables are independent ofmi and vi for all i. For this model there is no test for autocorrelation, by
its assumptions is ruled out. Even though this model is an appropriate specification, if there would
be a random sample from a large population, its estimation results were analyzed and compared.
Table 05 displays the results for the di↵erent specifications.
The Fixed e↵ects are imposed in model 1 and 3; random e↵ects in model 2 and 4. There is a
di↵erence in the electoral variable included for the models, as Ele, the electoral year was included,
another measure of electoral timing, called PPC was created and included. This variable tries to
compile any other electoral e↵ect, as it is equal to 1 the year before the electoral year and equal to
 1 the year after; it turned not significant.
34Beck and Katz (1995).
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Table 05
Summary of Results - Fixed and Random e↵ects
Dependent Variable: National price of gasoline
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intl pricedom 0.196*** 0.178*** 0.197*** 0.183***





cons  0.0149  0.0038  0.0148  0.0043
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
N 110 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1158 0.0903
Adj Rsq 0.0165  0.0118
AIC  210.5133  207.3885
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
Because we have not solved the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, our standard
errors may not be as accurate as they could, altering the estimation significance of the coe cients.
Hence, the selected procedure has to solve both problems without generating too many undesired
e↵ects. The fitted panel data model, Beck and Katz (1995) panel corrected standard errors, is used
for this purpose. With it, we gain explanatory leverage from cross-national and cross-temporal data,
while correcting for possible spatial and temporal correlation of errors.
We estimate three di↵erent variants of error correction for both models that we have (one with
Ele and the other with PPC ), the results are shown in Table 06. In the overall, we do not observe




Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: National price of gasoline
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intl pricedom 0.196** 0.193** 0.191***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.067)
Ele 0.0398** 0.0395** 0.0361*
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0190)
cons 0.0068 0.0074 0.0062
(0.044) (0.045) (0.056)
N 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1984 0.1907 0.2153
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
Even though our Ele variable is significant in all specification we have estimated, the opposite
sign results. This could be attributed to the fact that the variables included are yearly, which can
capture the post-election e↵ect in itself. For example, if the election takes place during the first
quarter it is probable that our dependent variable would behave di↵erently on the other three quar-
ters of the same year, but that is something our estimation is unable to di↵erentiate.35
35The results including the variable PPC do not change either, they are shown in Annex 03.
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Table 07
Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: National price of gasoline
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Intl pricedom 0.198** 0.181** 0.173**
(0.074) (0.074) (0.065)
Ele 0.0384* 0.0372* 0.0321*
(0.0210) (0.0190) (0.0170)
cons  0.0147  0.0134  0.0093
(0.0150) (0.0180) (0.0170)
N 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1162 0.0986 0.1052
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
Even if we do not control for the individual e↵ects, we get a very similar outcome: the election
year variable, Ele, is significant while PPC, is not,36 as we can see on Table 4. From all these results
we can observe that the estimated coe cient for our electoral variable suggests a significant e↵ect
of three percent approximately during periods of presidential elections.
This counter intuitive result may be explained by what Streb and Lema (2009) call the temporal
aggregation e↵ect. They show that annual data strongly underestimate the e↵ect of political budget
cycles. They explain if elections that take place between January and December, annual data would
not allow to identify the election year precisely. Di↵erent schemes have been proposed in order to
overcome this caveat, for example, Barberia and Avelino (2011) count the election year when the
election takes place on the second semester, if it takes place on the first semester, they consider the
pre electoral year. But still pre-electoral e↵ects may be spread out in the two years up to elections.
More importantly, they state that if the sign of policies is reversed after elections, lower frequency
36For the results refer to Annex 04.
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data may disguise PBC evidence as the e↵ects in the election year may cancel out, as Akhmedov
and Zhuravskaya (2004) point out in their country study for Russia.
The authors, Streb and Lema, give an example to illustrate the di↵erences between using an-
nual or quarterly data, they state that if an election takes place in June and we assume there is a
pre-electoral deterioration in the budget surplus (surplus =  1) during the four quarters running
up to elections, followed by an improvement (surplus = 1) the next four quarters. In the calendar
year in which elections take place, the net e↵ect on the budget surplus is zero. Of course not all
elections take place in June, when considering the other months the authors aggregate the e↵ects by
calendar year, and state that there is a serious underestimation of PBCs in the election year, since
pre-electoral expansions almost cancel out with post-electoral contractions, leaving a net expansive
e↵ect that is only 25% of the total stimulus before elections.37
Acknowledging their argument, it would be suitable to test our hypothesis using quarterly
data but as there is scarce data for these sample of countries it is something to address in future
research. Still it is an explanation of why our results, even though significant, have the opposite sign.
To test for robustness we estimate another set of models changing the variable of international
price of gasoline in domestic currency, for two variables: the international price of gasoline in US
dollars and the exchange rate. Table 08 shows the results, where the significance of our electoral
dummy remains. We observe as well, that the exchange rate has no significant relationship with our
dependent variable. Of course, the international price of oil keeps its significance as intuition would
have posited.
37A detailed explanation of their procedure is given in Annex 05.
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Table 08
Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: National price of gasoline
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14
Intl priceUS$ 0.266** 0.270** 0.273** 0.247***
(0.0650) (0.0640) (0.0670) (0.0670)
Exchange rate 0.0957 0.1070 0.0484 0.0501
(0.0720) (0.0680) (0.0780) (0.0780)
Ele 0.0414* 0.0412* 0.0413** 0.0360**
(0.0220) (0.0210) (0.0180) (0.0170)
cons  0.0199  0.0204 0.0263  0.0173
(0.0120) (0.0130) (0.0640) (0.0150)
N 110 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1603 0.2919 0.1650
Indiv E↵ects by country
Error Correction Panel Specific AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
For the last forty years there has been a significant evolution on the political budget cycle’s the-
oretical framework and on the industrial regulation as well. It seems, with all the evidence available
from these years that as time goes by, incumbents have implemented other type of manipulating
tools, maybe less obvious.
We may think of three main elements necessary for a political cycle to exist. First, there should
be a manipulating tool for the incumbent to manipulate the economy in such a way in which vot-
ers perceive it. From our findings, it seems as the regulated prices provide an alternative to the
traditional monetary and fiscal policy tools. Results showed a downward tendency on prices be-
fore elections, which reverts afterwards. Second, the voter has to perceive the change in economic
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conditions and interpret a positive change as competency from the incumbent. A survey made by
UNIMER in Costa Rica, before the last five elections, asks for those aspects the elected incumbent
should improve. Within the sample, a great majority considers the cost of living as the main factor
to improve. Through the price of regulated goods and services, the consumer/voter may perceive a
lower living cost. This results supports our idea that an indirect tool for the incumbent could be
the regulated industry prices, specially because it becomes known quite rapidly as mass media have
a constant coverage on this topic.
The third and last requirement is that there should exist a legal framework that o↵ers enough
degrees of freedom for the incumbent to be able to manipulate the economy through any of the
mentioned tools. So, even though empirical evidence supporting the political budget cycles theory
with fiscal or monetary policy tools is less frequent, we could say there is strong statistical evidence
supporting the existence of political price cycles in Costa Rica. We know that for this country there
is not an explicit interaction between the government and both regulatory agencies (Economics Min-
istry and the Regulating Authority of Public Services38 Nevertheless these agencies do not set the
prices of the goods and services, each providing firm does, even when they are publicly owned. This
condition does not imply independence between them and the state, but that their relation might
be a bit more complicated to define. If they were not independent and the model assumptions are
maintained, we would have an incumbent with indirect control over the prices of regulated goods
and services; in accordance to the Costa Rican legal framework this would not compromise any of
its faculties.
Still, it would be necessary for further research to consider the mechanics of price setting and
the level of independence between the government, the regulatory agency and the providing firms.
It is needed to study the real impact of regulatory networks on independence, performance and
accountability in order to complement the results for the Costa Rican case. As said by Maggetti
(2010:6) there exist a number of trade-o↵s concerning the simultaneous delivery of autonomy, per-
formance and accountability, and reliance on a single dimension is hardly su cient to legitimize
the regulatory process. He states that factual independence produces a net loss of legitimacy for
38Ministerio de Economia y Comercio (MEIC) and Autoridad Reguladora de los Servicios Publicos (ARESEP).
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a political system. And mentions that as a consequence, the political decision of delegating public
authority to independent regulatory agencies has quite fragile normative foundations and raises po-
tential qualms concerning its social sustainability.
The results of this chapter intend to contribute to the theoretical debate on the existence of
political cycles. Also, we pretend to show that there are other tools, such as the regulated prices
that may turn to be an indirect manipulating tool for the incumbent. These results provide an
objective characterization of the political price cycle for Costa Rica and gave some insights about
the behavior of a set of developing countries, giving important information for future voting decisions.
This chapter contributes to the literature in five aspects. First, we provided an empirical analysis
of political price cycles based on a sample of countries where it had not been tested before. Second,
we were able to identify the e↵ect for a wider sample of regulated goods. Third, we introduced a non
parametric appraisal tool for the political price cycles which had not been used before and provides
a complementary input for the empirical evidence. Fourth, we show that there is a significant e↵ect
between the gasoline prices and election in LA countries, which may be a starting point for future
research on the area. And finally, we have given another approach through the behavior of regulated
markets, to PBC theory, which can enrich past empirical results. We may even conclude that one




Figure 3.6: Behavior of Gasoline Prices by Election
Appendix 2




Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: National price of gasoline
Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a
Intl pricedom 0.178** 0.166** 0.171**
(0.075) (0.075) (0.067)
PPC  0.0093  0.0080  0.0071
(0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
cons 0.0243 0.0262 0.0232
(0.046) (0.046) (0.053)
N 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1753 0.1489 0.1906
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)




Summary of Results - Panel Corrected Standard Errors
Dependent variable: National price of gasoline
Model 8a Model 9a Model 10a
Intl pricedom 0.183** 0.157** 0.161***
(0.0720) (0.0710) (0.0620)
PPC  0.0060  0.0049  0.0058
(0.0150) (0.0140) (0.0120)
cons  0.0043  0.0026  0.0018
(0.0140) (0.0180) (0.0170)
N 110 110 110
Rsq 0.1753 0.1489 0.1906
Indiv E↵ects by country by country by country
Error Correction No AR(1) Common AR(1) Panel Specific AR(1)
Std errors in parentheses ⇤p < 0.10, ⇤ ⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤ ⇤ ⇤p < 0.01.
40
Appendix 5
Figure 3.8: Simulating the e↵ects of temporal aggregation on the budget surplus (Streb and Lema,
2009)
This table presents a simulation where Y (0) is the calendar year of elections, Y ( 1) is the year
before, and Y (1) the year after. The authors mention that for elections in the first quarter of the
election year, namely Y (0) Q(1), our text-book example of a pre-electoral expansion in the deficit
during the four quarters up to elections, followed by a contraction the next four quarters, implies
that surplus =  1 from Y ( 1) Q(2) to Y (0) Q(1), surplus = 1 from Y (0) Q(2) to Y (1) Q(1),
and surplus = 0 otherwise, when the budget surplus is at its average value, normalized here at zero.
The same procedure is followed for elections in the other three quarters. If we aggregate the e↵ects
by calendar year, there is a serious underestimation of PBCs in the election year, since pre-electoral
expansions almost cancel out with post-electoral contractions, leaving a net expansive e↵ect that
is only 25% of the total stimulus before elections. The least a↵ected by temporal aggregation are
post-electoral fiscal adjustments, since 62.5% of the total e↵ect is reflected the year after elections.
On the other hand, if there were no post-electoral fiscal adjustments, the problem of temporal ag-
gregation would be much less severe, since 62.5% of the total expansive e↵ect would be reflected the
calendar year of elections, 37.5% the year before.
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Conclusion
In our present, the recent financial crisis brought back the debate on fiscal policy e ciency.
This crises a↵ected all economies in one way or another, but there was not a clear policy pattern
implemented as response. For example, some countries opted for lowering interest rates and keeping
them practically in zero percent, while others incremented their public spending providing state
jobs or investing in infrastructure. The rich academic debate has given related areas of research
and opportunity to rethink important theories, the PBC theory is one of them. As introduced, our
thesis is empirical in nature and dealt with political cycles in relation to fiscal policy and regulated
markets. And even though, the scope of this assessment was not centered on the e↵ects of the crisis
in specific countries nor an evaluation of recovery policies, it may become a seminal contribution to
a further work.
The PBC theory predicts a pattern in fiscal policy, as an incumbent’s term in o ce starts,
during the first years of governance there is relative scarcity but at the end of his or her term, the
expenditure increases before elections. This increment has the purpose of singling competence, as
voters take the pre-electoral economic situation as an indicator of government’s performance. There-
fore, this theory becomes an important tool to analyze and with it understand recovery policies and
subsequent changes in the political environment because it helps us defining policy reaction functions.
We argued, in our first chapter, that fiscal manipulation is arbitraged by the contextual variable
of fiscal policy e ciency, which is determined by a time and unit specific set of economic conditions.
Hence, it contributes to the resurgence of the academic debate related to the return of Keynesian
policies. But could it be expected that there will be the same pattern of government spending (be-
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fore elections) and timing to start manipulating in countries with di↵erent characteristics? the time
of this chapter was to contribute to the discussion of the PBC topic, by estimating the magnitude
and significance of the political business cycle moderated by Md elasticity.
The evidence found favored timidly the hypothesis of the existence of the PBC in Latin Amer-
ican countries, not only as a pre-electoral fiscal expansion, but also having an e↵ect on the periods
after the election takes place. Even though all coe cients of interest did not turned significant in
the empirical testing the model seems to be quite robust. We can a rm that in the overall, from
1980 until 2005 Latin America’s incumbents have behaved in a pattern of rational opportunistic
manipulation, where the economy is stimulated before elections and adjustment is implemented
afterwards to avoid adverse long-term consequences (Nordhaus,1975). It would be interesting for
further research to determine the e↵ect of crisis on the amplitude of political cycles.
As well, it would be valuable to calculate fiscal multipliers and include them instead of our
elasticity measure, as they would also be determining the e↵ectiveness fiscal policy may have on
economic output. On the same line, further research could consider estimating measures of fiscal
policy e ciency on personal consumption or rent.
Our second chapter aimed to explore one of these other measures, the fiscal multipliers esti-
mated with a Structural Vector Autorregresion (SVAR) model. In order to examine the dynamic
responses of output and determine if fiscal expansive measures (increasing spending or reducing
taxes) have a positive e↵ect on economic growth we estimated the macroeconomic e↵ects of exoge-
nous fiscal policy shocks in Costa Rica (for the first time). Interestingly the results obtained provide
valuable input to determine Costa Rica’s fiscal policy reaction function and gives information on
the possibilities the incumbent could have trying to influence the economy by changing fiscal policy.
Hence, its contribution is implicitly related to the PBC theory.
There are methodological caveats in VAR models that could be considered in further research.
Some mention that the widespread use of informal restrictions may give rise to data mining. As
mentioned by Gottschalk (2001:33), since informal restrictions are often not made explicit by re-
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searchers some care is warranted when interpreting impulse response functions. According to Favero
and Giavazzi (2007) the impulse response estimated in VAR studies of fiscal policy shocks are all
biased as these studies do not consider the debt dynamics that arise after a fiscal policy shock.
The followed approach in this chapter tried to overcome these problems and only estimated the
average fiscal multipliers across the sample period. Further research could extend this framework to
include a time-varying setting, as we may think that fiscal policy e↵ectiveness can change over time
in accordance to a set of di↵erent economic circumstances.
The results of our second chapter complemented the vast empirical evidence on PBC theory
that proves to be context-conditioned. These results along with those of our third chapter, incite to
think there are other tools that the incumbent may implement before elections in order to increase
the probability of being re elected. Exploring the relation with regulated markets provided a new
focus to the topic and contributes to the theoretical debate on the existence of political cycles. Ac-
tually, the results of this chapter provide an objective characterization of the political price cycle for
a set of developing countries, giving important information for future voting decisions.
Our thesis contributes to the literature in four aspects. First, it provides empirical analysis of
political budget cycles, fiscal multipliers and political price cycles based on a sample of countries
were it had not been tested before or research is limited. Second, we provide significant information
to the debate on fiscal policy e ciency and neo-Keynesian theories. Third, we are able to identify
a clear non linear pattern on the political price cycle of Costa Rica. This methodology could be
implemented in other countries in order to broaden the empirical evidence on the topic. And fourth,
it sets the basis for further research on the topic although forty years have passed sin Nordhaus
stated for the first time what he called Political Business Cycles.
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